Small Electrical Fire Resulting from Improper Equipment Configuration

First Name
Andy
Last Name
Piatt

An employee noticed an unusual smell in a fuel cell laboratory. A shunt inside experimental equipment overheated and caused insulation on conductors to burn. Flames were approximately one inch high and very localized. The employee de-energized equipment and blew out the flames. No combustible material was in the vicinity of the experiment. The fire was contained within the fuel cell and resulted in no damage to equipment.

Concerns Related to Hydrogen Bottle Rupture

First Name
Andy
Last Name
Piatt

A 2000-psia-rated gas cylinder (nominal size 10"x1 1/2") was being filled with hydrogen to a target pressure of 1500 psia. The cylinder suffered a failure at an indicated pressure of 1500 psia during filling. Investigation of the failure subsequently revealed that a faulty digital readout had allowed the cylinder to be over-pressurized. There were no safety consequences due to the failure and no damage to the facility or equipment. The cylinder was being filled in a test vault that was specially designed for the high-pressure burst testing of pressure vessels and components.

Hydrogen Hose Fire

First Name
Andy
Last Name
Piatt

A pinhole at the base of a hand-held hydrogen torch, allowed hydrogen to leak. In the process of lighting a second torch, the leaking hydrogen was ignited. The operator, being startled by the "pop" of the lighted hydrogen allowed the #2 torch to drop and hang by its hose support approximately 6" from the floor. The hydrogen and oxygen hoses on the #1 torch were burned through and hung approximately 12" from the floor. The free burning #1 hose burned the #2 hydrogen and oxygen hose assembly through, causing both hoses assemblies to burn without valve control.

Failure of an Argon Check Valve

First Name
Andy
Last Name
Piatt

A facility replaced the copper tubing used for hydrogen distribution, with stainless steel tubing. This was done to address a fire protection concern related to the solder on the copper tubing being susceptible to heat, melting, and releasing a flammable gas. The facility maintenance personnel completed the replacement, noted the pressure on the hydrogen bottle, and left the building. When the maintenance person returned on the following day, s/he noticed the pressure on the hydrogen bottle had dropped 500 psi overnight, indicating a leak in the system.

Storage Tank CLFL Analyzer Out of Limits

First Name
Andy
Last Name
Piatt

A waste pretreatment tank operator was performing surveillance rounds on a tank and found the Composite Lower Flammability Limit (CLFL) Analyzer sample flow reading 1.4 cubic feet per hour (CFH). The Operational Safety Requirements (OSR) document required flow range is 1.5 CFH to 2.5 CFH. The Limiting Condition for Operation was immediately entered and the tank operator adjusted the flow into the required surveillance range.

Storage Tank LFL Analyzer Reading Out of Surveillance Limits

First Name
Andy
Last Name
Piatt

As a prerequisite to a storage tank slurry pump run, a tank operator identified a Lower Flammability Limit (LFL) Analyzer surveillance reading to the control room that was out of limits low. The reading was a negative zero % LFL indication (-0 % LFL). The tank operator roundsheet limits are 0 to 10% LFL. The "null" value (value read on analyzer when air with 0% LFL is drawn through the analyzer) as directed by the LFL Analyzer loop calibration procedure is set between 0 and 4% LFL.

Sodium Hydride Spontaneously Ignites During Weighing

First Name
Andy
Last Name
Piatt

A guest student was weighing out less than 200 mg of sodium hydride. The material reacted with moisture in the air, producing hydrogen. The heat of the reaction ignited the hydrogen on the end of the spatula being used to transfer the material and at the mouth of the bag holding the stock material (approximately 48 to 50 g). The student attempted to smother the flames with a cotton lab coat hanging nearby. He quickly determined that the lab coat was insufficient to smother the flames and entered the adjoining lab to get a fire extinguisher and warn other lab workers in the area.

Swagelok Fittings Under High Pressure

First Name
Andy
Last Name
Piatt

A shop supervisor determined that a second shift would be necessary to complete some priority work on the spare hydrogen mitigation pump. The work scope for the shift would be dedicated to continued fabrication of designed tubing runs, repairs to existing tubing with known leaks and pressure testing of other various tubing runs. The shift craft complement would include three pipe fitters, one welder, one QC inspector and a shift supervisor.

Improper Line Break During Cleaning Run

First Name
Andy
Last Name
Piatt

An operator began preparations for a cleaning run, and was unaware that a maintenance task to calibrate a pressure transducer was scheduled to also take place that morning. The calibration required a break on a hydrogen line in order to install a Measuring and Test Equipment (M&TE) gage, which was used in the calibration. At the time the operator was informed of the calibration, the cleaning run procedure had been initiated but the actual cleaning had not yet begun.

Roofing Work Condition Outside Authorization Basis

First Name
Andy
Last Name
Piatt

A facility manager was notified that an authorization basis requirement, associated with roofing contractor work, had not been met. The requirement was that an unused hydrogen gas cylinder adjacent to the building and not connected to a manifold be removed prior to the use of propane tanks for the hot tar portion of the work.

The project manager failed to remove the extra gas bottle as required because he did not recognize from the bottle color and lack of stencil that the bottle contained hydrogen.

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