A power plant reported a hydrogen leak inside an auxiliary building. The given plant was in cold shutdown at the time of the event. The discovery of this problem was as a result of an unassociated event involving the activation of a chlorine monitor in the control building. When additional samples indicated no chlorine gas, the shift supervisor ordered further investigation into other plant areas. Because there was no installed detection equipment, portable survey instruments were used to determine gaseous mixtures.
Description of Circumstances
A hydrogen generation plant experienced a fire and significant damage due to a concussive combustion event that started in a high-pressure hydrogen feed pipe.
One man was killed and another severely injured while working with a portable battery power supply.
At a test facility, a water-submersible portable battery power supply was used to power lighting. The battery power supply contained two 12-volt lead-acid automotive batteries, a wiring harness, and switching relays mounted in an air-tight case suitable for submersion in water. The case possessed ½-inch aluminum walls and a 13.8-pound lid. The box had been used periodically over two years.
A small electrical fire occurred (due to what is believed to be an electrical short circuit) inside a fuel cell test stand. Subsequently, a nearby hydrogen line made of flexible tubing was melted through and ignited the hydrogen, causing a small fire.
The electrical fire was easily extinguished. The hydrogen flame was extinguished by snuffing the flame, shutting off the gas lines and power to the test stand. No one was injured, but damage was incurred in the test stand.
At an offsite liquid H2 fill station, a liquid hydrogen trailer hit a gaseous H2 purge shut off valve handle. Tubing attached to the purge valve was bent on both ends but did not leak.
The driver was not sufficiently careful in approaching the liquid H2 system fill point.
During a standard testing procedure, a 3,000 psig relief valve actuated at normal line pressure, releasing gaseous H2. The gaseous H2 combined with air, resulting in an explosion which damaged the test facility.
The relief valve was improperly set to open at line pressure, and the inspection was inadequate in that it didn't identify this error. Contributing cause was poor design of the venting system, which was installed in a horizontal position, causing inadequate venting and buildup of static electricity.
During routine facility maintenance of an automatic battery charging system, 6 of 27 nickel cadmium batteries being reinstalled exploded.
Inadequate work procedures in that a probable cause was ignition of accumulated hydrogen gas by a spark generated during the replacement work, and inadequate ventilation of the battery area; a second probable cause was stopped up vent caps, resulting from contaminated electrolyte, which permitted hydrogen pressure build up to an explosive force in the 6 batteries.
SummaryA fire occurred in a battery manufacturing plant that was about to cease operations for the night. The fire caused an estimated $2.4 million in property damage when an electrical source ignited combustible hydrogen vapors.BackgroundThe incident occurred in the forming room, where wet cell batteries were stored for charging on metal racks. The facility had a wet-pipe sprinkler system, but no automatic hydrogen detection equipment.Incident SynopsisAt 11:52 pm, a security guard on patrol noticed a free burning fire in the forming room and notified the fire department.