While filling a sample cylinder with compressed hydrogen gas, a quick-disconnect coupler fitting came loose within a stainless steel laboratory hood, allowing a small purge of the hydrogen gas to escape directly into the hood through ~1/4-inch Tygon tubing. The stainless steel quick-disconnect fitting struck the stainless steel bottom of the laboratory hood and the hydrogen gas caught fire. It is not known what caused the hydrogen gas to catch fire. The most likely sources of a spark was from metal-to-metal contact of the quick-disconnect fitting with the laboratory hood floor, or the discharge of static electrical charge generated by flow of hydrogen gas through Tygon tubing. The resultant narrow jet of fire, directed toward the left side of the laboratory hood, extinguished itself view more
What is H2LL?
This database is supported by the U.S. Department of Energy. The safety event records have been contributed by a variety of global sources, including industrial, government and academic facilities.
H2LL is a database-driven website intended to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned and other relevant information gained from actual experiences using and working with hydrogen. The database also serves as a voluntary reporting tool for capturing records of events involving either hydrogen or hydrogen-related technologies.
The focus of the database is on characterization of hydrogen-related incidents and near-misses, and ensuing lessons learned from those events. All identifying information, including names of companies or organizations, locations, and the like, is removed to ensure confidentiality and to encourage the unconstrained future reporting of events as they occur.
The intended audience for this website is anyone who is involved in any aspect of hydrogen use. The existing safety event records are mainly focused on laboratory settings that offer valuable insights into the safe use of hydrogen in energy applications and R&D. It is hoped that users will come to this website both to learn valuable lessons from the experiences of others as well as to share information from their own experiences. Improved safety awareness benefits all.
Development of the database has been primarily supported by the U.S. Department of Energy. While every effort is made to verify the accuracy of information contained herein, no guarantee is expressed or implied with respect to the completeness, causal attribution, or suggested remedial measures for avoiding future events of a similar nature. The contents of this database are presented for informational purposes only. Design of any energy system should always be developed in close consultation with safety experts familiar with the particulars of the specific application.
We encourage you to browse through the safety event records on the website and send us your comments and suggestions. We will continue to add new records as they become available.
How does H2LL work?
If you have an incident you would like to include in the H2LL database, please click the "Submit an Incident" button at the top of the page. You will be asked for a wide range of information on your incident. Please enter as much of the information as possible. In order to protect your and your employer's identities, information that may distinguish an incident (your contact information, your company's name, the location of the incident, etc.) will not be displayed in the incident reports on H2LL.
Lessons Learned Corner
Visit the Lessons Learned Corner Archives.
Key themes from the H2Incidents database will be presented in the Lessons Learned Corner. Safety event records will be highlighted to illustrate the relevant lessons learned. Please let us know what you think and what themes you would like to see highlighted in this safety knowledge corner. You can find all the previous topics in the archives.
An individual inadvertently connected a pure hydrogen gas bottle to a chamber/glove box as opposed to a 10% hydrogen (in nitrogen) bottle that should have been used. [The wrong bottle had mistakenly been delivered, and the inexperienced individual did not know the difference.] The hydrogen concentration increased within the chamber to about 9%. Since there was insufficient oxygen in the chamber to support combustion, the hydrogen did not burn, and was quickly diluted with nitrogen.
A hose clamp failed on a low-pressure vent line from a hydrogen reactor experiment and effluent was leaked into the laboratory. Unburnt hydrogen in the effluent stream triggered the low-level hydrogen alarm. The hose clamp was resecured and other hose clamps were checked for proper tightness.
The contractor was replacing a needle valve and a check valve on the nitrogen purge line to the dispenser because of a small leak at the connection between the needle valve and the check valve. On reinstalling the valves, the contractor installed the check valve backwards, causing the pressure disk in the regulator to fail, venting about 1000 psig hydrogen into the air for about 10 seconds. This was found during testing of the contractor's work before the system was returned to normal service.
The System Shutdown logic activated and the compressor automatically shut down on high vibration. When the operator investigated the unplanned shutdown, two broken compressor head fasteners were noted lying on the deck.
Hydrogen was found to be leaking from a vent line during cryogenic loading operations. The leak was attributed to a cracked weld on a hydrogen vent line that consisted of (1) double wall aluminum piping and (2) slotted spacers between the inner and outer line to provide a hydrogen gas blanket for insulation. The weld that failed was repaired using a "clamshell" over the area of the failed weld in order to support continued operations. A portion of the failed weld was removed for analysis prior to the repair. After operations, the clamshell repair was excised from the non-vacuum-jacketed double wall piping to allow further analysis of the failed weld. It was later replaced with a new half shell piping section.
DESCRIPTION: On a Friday afternoon in 2007 a traffic accident occurred at the corner of two urban streets. Two vehicles were involved. Each vehicle contained a single driver (no passengers). Vehicle 1 was a Fuel Cell Vehicle. Vehicle 2 was a conventional Toyota Camry. Vehicle 1 was traveling west, approaching an intersection with a green light, and proceeded into the intersection. Vehicle 2 was traveling north on a cross street. The driver of Vehicle 2 incorrectly perceived a green light and proceeded into the intersection. The vehicles collided in the intersection.
RESPONSE: The police were coincidentally in the area and able to respond quickly to the site. The vehicles were moved out of the intersection. Vehicle 1 (fuel cell vehicle) shut down upon impact and was pushed out of view more
A five-pound CO2 cylinder being stored in a compressed gas storage cage at a power plant failed catastrophically and became a missile. The cylinder destroyed the storage cage, then struck one of six stationary hydrogen storage cylinders used as emergency make-up for the hydrogen supply system. One of the hydrogen cylinders was broken away from its mounts and moved 10 feet from its original location. The loss of this cylinder severed the manifold tubing, creating a leak path to the atmosphere for the remaining five hydrogen cylinders. The leaking hydrogen gas apparently self-ignited, engulfing the immediate area. The site fire brigade responded and used hose lines from a distance to provide cooling until the hydrogen supply was consumed. The fire was out within seven minutes, and no off view more
A sidewall burst failure of a high-pressure polytetrafluoroethylene-lined hose was experienced. The 4.0-m hose was in service for approximately two years, primarily for 70 MPa fueling of hydrogen at ambient conditions ranging from -40 C to +50 C. The total number of fills during its service life was estimated to be 150. In addition to the high-volume fill events, pressure cycling occurred as part of the routine test procedures and operational protocols. These additional pressure-cycling occurrences were approximated to be 200-250 cycles. During each filling cycle, the hose was allowed to bend during connections, as required by the situation. Failure of the hose occurred while temporarily connected to a gas booster, after 1-2 hours of service at 75 MPa. There were no tight bends in the view more
A hydrogenation experiment was being performed under 60 atm hydrogen, inside a high-pressure reactor cell. The experiment was conducted inside a fume hood and left overnight. The hood caught fire during the night, resulting in fire damage to the fixture, hood, and exhaust duct, as well as water damage to much of the building. Based on the local fire department investigation, the fire started from faulty electrical wiring that was used to provide power for reactor cell heating. The electrical fire ignited solvent that was in a dispensing bottle inside the hood, which subsequently overheated the reactor cell, rupturing the seals. The rupture released hydrogen from the cell and attached supply tank, further fueling the fire. Nobody was injured in the incident, and damages were limited. It view more