An employee noticed an unusual smell in a fuel cell laboratory. A shunt inside experimental equipment overheated and caused insulation on conductors to burn. Flames were approximately one inch high and very localized. The employee de-energized equipment and blew out the flames. No combustible material was in the vicinity of the experiment. The fire was contained within the fuel cell and resulted in no damage to equipment.
A brazing retort in a shop malfunctioned and resulted in an explosion that propelled the retort shell to the roof of the brazing area and then back to the floor. There were no injuries but damage was sustained by the furnace housing and the retort shell.
Administrative personnel were soon on the scene to make a preliminary assessment of the situation. An expert safety team was retained to assist in the investigation of the explosion. The safety team conducted their initial field investigation on the afternoon of the explosion and again on the following day.
An explosion occurred in a Microbiological Anaerobic Chamber of approximately 2 m3 capacity that contained an explosive mixture of hydrogen and air. A fire followed the explosion, but was rapidly extinguished by staff using fire extinguishers prior to the arrival of fire service personnel. The pressure wave from the explosion blew windows out of the laboratory, with glass hitting a passerby on a path outside and glass shards landing up to 30 m away.
A demolition technician noted an elevated combustible gas lower explosive limit (LEL) on a pipe that was being tested prior to cutting (No. 2 pipe). The No. 2 pipe was one of four pipes being tested. The other three pipes tested less than detectable for combustible hydrogen gas. Testing involves tapping the pipe and connecting the pipe to an Explosive Gas Detector via a tube. When an elevated LEL is identified, the pipe is allowed to vent and then retested prior to cutting. After tapping the No. 2 pipe, the work crew left the pipe open to vent and departed the area for the end of shift.
An unplanned shutdown of the hydrogen supply system occurred, affecting the hydrogen furnaces in the plant. The apparent cause was an inadvertent valve closing, which was contrary to the written procedure.
Saltwell Pump May Have Been Operated While the Standard Hydrogen Monitoring System was Not in Operational Mode
One morning a saltwell pump was placed in operation. Operation of this equipment requires that the Standard Hydrogen Monitoring System (SHMS) cabinet be in operation. Later that morning, during the morning surveillance rounds, the Standard Hydrogen Monitoring System (SHMS) cabinet was found not to be in the operational mode.
One man was killed and another severely injured while working with a portable battery power supply.
At a test facility, a water-submersible portable battery power supply was used to power lighting. The battery power supply contained two 12-volt lead-acid automotive batteries, a wiring harness, and switching relays mounted in an air-tight case suitable for submersion in water. The case possessed ½-inch aluminum walls and a 13.8-pound lid. The box had been used periodically over two years.
A faulty modification to a multiple-gas piping manifold allowed mixing of hydrogen and oxygen that resulted in a storage tube explosion. Several employees suffered severe burn injuries from the incident.
A technician was welding a cable suspended over a stainless steel H2 instrument line. During the welding process, two holes were accidentally burned through the hydrogen tubing. The operator heard a hissing sound and closed the valve, but the hydrogen had already ignited and it burned his hand while he was feeling for a leak.
A short during welding caused the pinholes in the tubing containing the gaseous H2.
While a hot air dryer was being used to free a coupling in a hydrogen cryostat (an apparatus used to maintain constant low temperatures), a flash fire occurred. The H2 cryostat was being dismantled.
The temperature at the center of the cryostat was sufficiently low to liquefy air. The prescribed requirements for purging and bringing the cryostat to room temperature were circumvented. The H2 - air mixture was formed and ignition was assumed to be a spark from an open filament of the dryer.
- = No Ignition
- = Explosion
- = Fire
- = No Ignition
- = Explosion
- = Fire