Severity
Non-Event
Leak
No
Ignition
No

During a test run of a hybrid, fuel-cell-powered passenger ship, the on-board lead-acid batteries overheated, resulting a fire in the battery compartment. The local fire department was able to quickly put the fire out.The batteries had been replaced a few days prior from the battery supplier and were in the process of being tested for the first time on the river.The batteries are charged slowly from the fuel cell and the power is made available for cast-off and driving maneuvers.It was systematically confirmed that the fire, which was comparable to a conventional cable fire, posed no risk to the fuel cells or the hydrogen storage tanks. There was never a danger to the captain or crew, and the fire department confirmed that there was never a risk of fire spreading to the other compartments or explosion. The cause of the fire has not yet been determined since the official investigation is still underway.

Incident Date
Apr 28, 2010
Setting
Equipment
  • Batteries and Related Equipment
  • Batteries
Damage and Injuries
Probable Cause
Contributing Factors
When Incident Discovered
Lessons Learned

All installed and certified safety and emergency systems functioned as designed.1. The fuel cell turned off immediately after fire detection.2. The fire suppression system was immediately initiated thereafter.3. The physical separation of the batteries, the fuel cell, and the hydrogen tanks prevented the fire from spreading. This separation was developed from the FMEA of the ship and hybrid system.4. No hydrogen leaked (i.e., the physical separation worked). However, direct fire contact or overheating of the hydrogen tanks would lead to a controlled automatic discharge of hydrogen outside the vessel.5. The CO2 fire-fighting system in the battery room was activated for fire suppression. However, the hatch was left open by the battery supplier for the test run, which reduced the effectiveness of the suppression.

Key:

  • = No Ignition
  • = Explosion
  • = Fire
Hydrogen Incident Summaries by Equipment and Primary Cause/Issue
Equipment / Cause Equipment Design or Selection Component Failure Operational Error Installation or Maintenance Inadequate Gas or Flame Detection Emergency Shutdown Response Other or Unknown
Hydrogen Gas Metal Cylinder or Regulator   3/31/2012
4/30/1995
2/6/2013
4/26/2010 12/31/1969     3/17/1999
11/1/2001
12/23/2003
Piping/Valves 4/4/2002
2/2/2008
5/11/1999
4/20/1987
11/4/1997
12/31/1969
8/19/1986
7/27/1991
12/19/2004
2/6/2008
10/3/2008
4/5/2006
5/1/2007
9/19/2007
10/31/1980
2/7/2009 1/24/1999
2/24/2006
6/8/1998
12/31/1969
2/7/2009

9/1/1992
10/31/1980

10/3/2008  
Tubing/Fittings/Hose   9/23/1999
8/2/2004
8/6/2008
9/19/2007
1/1/1982 9/30/2004
10/7/2005
  10/7/2005  
Compressor   10/5/2009
6/10/2007
8/21/2008
1/15/2019
    10/5/2009 8/21/2008  
Liquid Hydrogen Tank or Delivery Truck 4/27/1989 12/19/2004
1/19/2009
8/6/2004 12/31/1969   1/1/1974 12/17/2004
Pressure Relief Device 7/25/2013
5/4/2012
1/15/2002
1/08/2007
12/31/1969        
Instrument 1/15/2019 3/17/1999
12/31/1969
2/6/2013
    11/13/73    
Hydrogen Generation Equipment 7/27/1999     10/23/2001      
Vehicle or Lift Truck   7/21/2011         2/8/2011
12/9/2010
Fuel Dispenser   8/2/2004
5/1/2007
6/11/2007
9/19/2007
  2/24/2006
1/22/2009
     
Fuel Cell Stack            

5/3/2004
12/9/2010
2/8/2011

Hydrogen Cooled Generator       12/31/1969
2/7/2009
     
Other (floor drain, lab
anaerobic chamber,
heated glassware,
test chamber,
gaseous hydrogen
composite cylinder,
delivery truck)
  11/14/1994
7/21/2011
7/27/1999
6/28/2010
8/21/2008
12/31/1969
3/22/2018
    6/10/2019
  • = No Ignition
  • = Explosion
  • = Fire