A distillate dewaxing unit at an oil refinery was undergoing hot hydrogen regeneration of the catalyst when an explosion occurred. Catalyst regeneration is a periodically performed procedure, in which the normal liquid hydrocarbon feed is stopped and a hydrogen-rich gas mixture is fed through the catalyst bed for which the normal operating temperature is raised from 700F to 800F. During the catalyst regeneration process the reactor pressure is increased from normal operating levels just below 600 psig to about 640 psig. A pipe failure occurred as a sudden and complete rupture of the 10-inch diameter line at the exit of one of the two reactors. Security video revealed that the release rapidly exapnded and the hot gas mixture ignited shortly after rupture. A shock wave from the resulting view more
A chemical plant experienced a valve failure during a planned shutdown for maintenance that caused hydrogen to leak from a valve and catch fire. Four chemical reactor chambers in series were being emptied of liquid using hydrogen gas as part of a maintenance procedure. Two heater valves were opened allowing 3000 psi hydrogen to flow in reverse direction to purge the reactor system for approximately 25 minutes. At completion of the purging process, a "light" thud was heard as the reactor empty-out valves are being closed. Smoky vapor was observed coming out of one of the reactor empty-out valves and the valve closing was stopped by the operator. The operator summoned a second operator for help at which time a second "loud" thud was heard with a much larger light and view more
Only 25 minutes after the normal work shift ended, an explosion occurred at a hydrogen storage and use facility that had been in a non-operational mode for several months while undergoing modifications for future tests. No one was in the facility at the time of the explosion. The event was viewed about 30 seconds after the explosion by two engineers in a blockhouse 1000 feet away. Authorities were notified and calls were placed to other personnel needed to secure the area. About 8 minutes later, the engineers moved to a vantage point about 450 feet from the facility. There they viewed heat waves rising from a central location on the test pad, heard popping sounds similar to gaseous hydrogen (GH2) venting on a burn pond, and suspected that a hydrogen fire was in process. They returned view more
Hydrogen was released near the ground when the vent line from a 13,000-gallon liquid hydrogen storage vessel suffered damage from unusually high winds. The toppled vent line did not shear or tear, but sustained a kink that restricted hydrogen flow and created a back pressure on the vessel relief system.
Repair efforts were hampered by the potential for cold hydrogen gas, a flammability hazard, in the work area. Shut off or redirection of the hydrogen was not possible, and variable breezes made set up of safe zones uncertain. A protocol had not been prepared for this scenario.
A refinery hydrocracker effluent pipe section ruptured and released a mixture of gases, including hydrogen, which instantly ignited on contact with the air, causing an explosion and a fire. Excessive high temperature, likely in excess of 1400°F (760°C), initiated in one of the reactor beds spread to adjacent beds and raised the temperature and pressure of the effluent piping to the point where it failed. An operator who was checking a field temperature panel at the base of the reactor and trying to diagnose the high-temperature problem was killed. A total of 46 other plant personnel were injured and 13 of these were taken to local hospitals, treated, and released. There were no reported injuries to the public.
Property damage included an 18-inch (46-centimeter) long tear in the view more
The bulkhead between a liquid hydrogen tank and a liquid oxygen tank failed due to a series of events. Air services to the building were shut down for repairs and the facility had switched to an emergency nitrogen supply. Failure to switch back to service air when it became available, led to the mishap.
The emergency supply became depleted and two valves in the normal nitrogen purge system failed in the open position, releasing the high-pressure nitrogen gas from the manifold into the liquid hydrogen tank. The gas flow raised the liquid hydrogen tank pressure to 4.5 psig. That was sufficient to rupture the bulkhead wall.
A solution of potassium carbonate was being drawn off to an inventory tank for a turnaround/shutdown maintenance activity at a refinery's hydrogen production unit. On the day of the incident, the solution level in the tower wasn't checked as it should have been, which resulted in hydrogen gas flowing back into the tank until the increased pressure caused the tank to explode. The direct cause of the incident was the workers neglecting to check the solution level in the tower. It is not known whether the potential for backflow of hydrogen gas into the inventory tank was understood beforehand or not.
An explosion occurred due to unexpected backflow of hydrogen gas while a solution of potassium carbonate was being drawn off to an view more
A laboratory technician died and three others were injured when hydrogen gas being used in experiments leaked and ignited a flash fire.
The incident occurred in a 5,700-square-foot, single-story building of unprotected non-combustible construction. The building was not equipped with automatic gas detection or fire suppression systems.
Employees in the laboratory were conducting high-pressure, high-temperature experiments with animal and vegetable oils in a catalytic cracker under a gas blanket. They were using a liquefied petroleum gas burner to supply heat in the process.
Investigators believe that a large volume of hydrogen leaked into the room through a pump seal or a pipe union, spread throughout the laboratory, and ignited after coming into contact with the view more
An employee at a soap manufacturing plant died in a flash fire outside the facility's hydrogenation building. Responding personnel encountered a fire at the base of the plant's hydrogen storage towers, and they found the victim, who was burned over 90 percent of his body, some 50 feet away.
Officials determined that a pipe connection failed and that hydrogen, pressurized at 1,800 psi, ignited when it was released into the atmosphere, killing the plant operator.
According to reports, the pipe connection failure stemmed from pressures higher than design tolerance, which in turn were the result of over tightening that occurred during routine maintenance replacement. The new bolts were stronger than those they replaced, and the threads of the nuts had been partially view more
During start-up operation of a high-temperature, high-pressure plant using hydrogen, hydrogen gas leaked from the flange of a heat exchanger and a fire occurred. The leakage occurred for two reasons:
Insufficient tightening torque control was carried out during hot-bolting and an unbalanced force was generated across the bolts.
A temperature rise was induced across the heat exchanger as a result of a revamping activity, during a turnaround shutdown.
Hot-bolting: In equipment and piping that operate at high temperatures, as the temperatures rise, the tightening force decreases, thus re-tightening of bolts is necessary. This work is called hot-bolting. The design conditions of the evaporator where the fire occurred were 2.4 MPaG, view more