- Home
-
Resources
- Center for Hydrogen Safety
- Hydrogen Fuel Cell Codes and Standards
- Learnings & Guidance
- Paper & References
- Web-based Toolkits
- Contact
- About H2Tools
Disclaimer: The Lessons Learned Database includes the incidents that were voluntarily submitted. The database is not a comprehensive source for all incidents that have occurred.
Personnel should be aware that items requiring special receiving inspections should still be verified/examined by the end user prior to use.
Given that the anaerobic chamber and associated nearby electrical equipment were not designed or…
This incident led to several changes in procedure:
After the aforementioned incident, a rigid cage was designed to protect the reactor from external conditions, and to protect the contents of the hood and any experimenter from the reactor, in the event of a pressure burst from the reactor cell.…
In addition to resealing the glove box window, a positive pressure of argon gas was maintained inside the glove box while the course of action was planned. Subsequently, the glove box was cleaned up by specialized hazardous materials personnel…
The researcher's failure to pull the fire alarm was an oversight of required facility practice. The alarm should have been triggered in consideration of the potential for greater harm to personnel and facilities.
Hot, reacting ammonia…
The procedure for disposal of spent or partially spent AB has been modified so that it does not include the use of water. Instead, the AB is removed from containers and transferred for disposal by rinsing with mineral oil, silicone oil or other…
Key:
We are the leaders in the building industries and factories. We're word wide. We never give up on the challenges.