Skip to main content

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fuels Fire in a Refinery
A fire broke out affecting the heavy fuel purification plant of the refinery.The incident could have originated by the failure of one of the following plant components:- pipes leading to the pressure gauges of the reactor - recycled gas pipe at the bottom of the reactor having a quench function,- diatermic oil pipe (hot oil) entering or exiting the exchanger- flanged joints exchanger and connection lines.On the base of and data logging and video evidences, the company excludes a release from the hot oil circuit as the triggering factor of the fire. The release started 30 minutes before the fire. Also a release from the hydrogen pipes is not considered likely, as the records demonstrate that the hydrogen pipe failed 7 min after fire began. Concerning the flange joints of exchangers, after dismounting the exchanger flanged joints, the gaskets resulted not to be damaged. The company concluded that the failure of a pipe from the pressure measurement gauges of reactor is the most likely accident triggering factor. This assumption is supported by the following facts:1) this part is located in the area corresponding to the epicenter of the fire,2) the area corresponds to the area visually identified by the witnesses,3) the product release (hydrogen and fuel oil) from one of these pipes can cause a 6 m long jet flame as occurred.4) the product supposedly released would have had a high enough temperature and pressure to self-ignite or ignite against a hot spot of the plant, like the hot oil circuit.5) the damages recorded were caused by overheating (flame exposition) and were not caused by overpressure or explosion - the pressure measurement records confirm significant pressure changes at the beginning of the event. The company does not have any element allowing to identify the failure that caused the pipe to rupture.
Event Date
September 1, 2005
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The immediate cause of the accident is the release and ignition of fuels from a joint. The root cause is unknown.
Facility Information
Application Type
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
catalytic hydro-treatment plant, pipes, heat exchanger
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
The main characteristics of the affected plant are:Capacity of 1650 t/d (light fuel treatment section) and 1450 t/d (heavy fuel treatment section)Th goal of the unit is to improve the characteristics of light and heavy fuel oil produced in the refinery by treating them with high pressure hydrogen on a specific catalyst, to eliminate the sulfur in the fuel oil, produce hydrogen sulfide, hydrogenate the hydrocarbons and improve other characteristics. The plant was designed with two heating - reaction - fractionating sections, one for light fuel oil mixtures (the unit affected) and one for the heavy fuel oil mixtures, while foreseeing one single gas purification and compression section for the recycled gas to be reintegrated in the circuit.
Currency
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
The operator decided to rebuild the plant with a new executive project, in consideration of the damage caused to the plant. The new executive project foresees essentially:- the complete separation of the light fuel oil section and the heavy fuel section such to avoid for example the possibility of domino effects,- lowering the maximum height for the installation to facilitate fire extinguishing operations- reconstruction of the plant in compliance with the PED directive,- rationalizing the piping system to minimize adjacencies, relocate valves on the hydrogen quench line to maintain the line depressurized, reduce the number of measurement gauges and insertion of valves in a safe area for depressurizing the hot oil circuit.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
21:40 The fire starts and the emergency plan is activated.21:40 the fire brigade is alerted. The fire is kept under control and evolves without noticeable changes until consumption of the fuel, once the pipes were shut off according to the emergency response.1:20 of the day after the fire is extinguished (3 hours and 40 minutes after the fire initiated) and 1: 45 The state of emergency is called off by the fire brigade
Release Type
Release Substance
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Flame Type
Source Category
References
References

From public part of MARS database

We are professional and reliable provider since we offer customers the most powerful and beautiful themes. Besides, we always catch the latest technology and adapt to follow world’s new trends to deliver the best themes to the market.

Contact info

We are the leaders in the building industries and factories. We're word wide. We never give up on the challenges.

Recent Posts