The incident occurred in a facility chrome-plating metals. At the time of the event, a metal roller was being chrome-plated. A short circuit occurred due to a defective contacting (contact rails) on the rectifier. This short circuit caused a spark to reach the surface of the electrolyte bath, and the spark ignited the hydrogen produced during chrome plating, causing an explosion.Various windows within the company were destroyed, but nobosy was injured.

A leak occurred at a of a liquid withdrawal valve of a liquid hydrogen storage tank. The hydrogen escaped at the flange between the valve body and the upper part of the valve (flange with tongue and groove). 40 kg of hydrogen were lost.The accidental release was due to the use of bolts different from those prescribed. By using the wrong ones (old bolts), the bolt material was able to flow at the specified tighteningtorque. This meant that there was insufficient tightening torque, which led to a leak.

This event occurred when a hydrogen-carrying trailer was supplying hydrogen to a chemical plant. Instead of filling the hydrogen stationary storage, large quantities of hydrogen were transferred from the trailer into the compressed air plant network. The explosive atmosphere ignited in a compressed air consumer (a solid silo which was not containing hazardous materials).

The FCEV was travelling at approx. 75 km/h (80 km/h speed limit) on a straight, downhill part of the road. Another vehicles was waiting at a STOP sign on the right side, did not see the incoming FCEV and drove into the road at the moment of the FEV passing. The second vehicle hit the FCEV on the back right side. There were only body parts damaged and no hydrogen was released. There was no oil or other fluid spillage and no people were injured.The diagnostic system of the FCEV did not issue any alarm, and there were no warning lights to indicate a problem with the hydrogen systems on-board.

The fire developed on a hydrogen bus during filling, and was detected due to the development of smoke and a smell of burned materials.The power cable of the compressor had overheated. Two are the possible causes: (1) the cable had been wrongly installed or fixed, or (2) the electrical system had caused too high current in the cable. The corrective actions have been:(a) To ship the affected component to the manufacturing company for inspection(b) To replacement of the affected component with a new one. (c) To perform an inspection of the system on all the other buses in function.

A truck-trailer carrying compressed hydrogen cylinders stopped on an autobahn and reported a hydrogen leaking from the cylinders. The highway was immediately closed in both directions. When the fire brigade arrived, the truck had stopped on a hard shoulder, and the driver had al-ready left his vehicle. A pipe was reported to be leaking hydrogen. Fire-fighters closed a valve on the affexted cylinder group to stop the leak.

The fire developed an early morning on a hydrogen bus at a refuelling station for public transport. The fire Department was called to site responding to reports of a fire on the property. A section of the highway was closed as firefighters.According to the bus company release, one bus was destroyed and the dispenser of the hydrogen fuelling station was damaged. The stationary hydrogen storage and the rest of the Explosions were heard and seen from the tanks on the bus that had just been filled.

DISCLAIMER: this event description is unsatisfactory. Details on the system and the real incident evolution are (still) missing. The incident affected a prototype light hydrogen vehicle in a hydrogen research centre of a university. The vehicle was a kind of a four-wheeled scooter. The fire started on the vehicle while being filled. Apparently, the hydrogen storage system was a hydrogen hydride. The site was evacuated and the building isolated from its hydrogen supply. The firefighters attacked the fire with a hose and extinguished it one hour later.

A fire broke out following a hydrogen leak on the cyclododecane unit in a chemical plant. A plume of smoke became visible outside the site. The fire was brought under control by putttng the unit in safe mode, implementing the internal resources available on site (monitor lance, sprinkler ring and extinguishers), and finally by the inervention of the internal firefighters. The staff was evacuated and the internal crisis unit triggered. The fire was extinguished in 30 minutes. The post-incident analysis revealed a hole in the connection of the vent manifold, upstream of the evacuation pipe.

A fire broke out on the insulating plastic elements of an alkaline electrolyzer in a unit of a chemical plant. The shift saw the smoke from the control room. The first action was to drain the potash into a tank provided for this purpose and to shut down the electrolyzer. The on-call electrician interrupted the electricity. The safety technician brought the fire under control in less than 10 minutes using CO2 extinguishers. After approximately six hours, the unit is restarted.