Explosion in a Steel Factory
Workers were performing demolition on a disused furnace. While removing a 10 inch valve from a pipe used to supply coke gas fuel to the furnace, flammable liquid was unexpectedly released and ignited. The flammable material consisted of methane, hydrogen, carbon monoxide and solid coke. The workers were not aware that there might be flammable material still in the pipe. The blast occurred when gas from the line came into contact with heaters which have open flames to keep nearby equipment from freezing. The accident resulted in the death of two workers and 5 others were injured. The two workers that died were working on a platform about 20 feet above the ground and did not have means to escape the fire.
Event Date
February 2, 2001
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments
The immediate cause of the fire was the gas from the line came into contact with flames to keep nearby equipment from freezing.Root cause is the inadequacy of the management systems for the supervision, planning, and execution of maintenance work.A contributing cause was the absence of a program to identify and address hazards during decommissioning and demolition operations (The workers were not aware of the possible presence of flammable material still in the pipe.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
furnace, heater
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
Workers were performing demolition on a disused furnace. Heaters with open flame were used. While removing a 25 cm diameter valve from a pipe used to supply coke gas fuel to the furnace, flammable liquid was unexpectedly released and ignited.
Environmental Damage
0
Property Loss (onsite)
Y
Property Loss (offsite)
N
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
The CSB issued the following recommendations to the plant operator: 1. Implement a work authorization program that requires higher levels of management review, approval, and oversight for jobs that present higher levels of risk, such as opening lines potentially containing flammable liquids where there is no low point drain. 2. Monitor the accumulation and flammability of COG condensate throughout the mill and address potentially hazardous changes 3. Survey the mill for dead legs and implement a program for resolving the hazards. Develop guidance for plant personnel on the risks of dead legs and their prevention. Include dead legs in plant winterization planning4. Provide drains at low points in piping to allow for the safe draining of potentially flammable material.6. Establish procedures to ensure that insulation is replaced when removed for maintenance.7 Conduct periodic audits of work authorization, line and equipment opening, dead leg management programs, and decommissioning and demolition activities and share findings with the workforce.8. Revise the Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) for COG condensate to highlight the potential flammability hazard. 9. Ensure that management trains employees and informs contractors with regard to the potential presence of flammable liquids when working with or opening COG condensate piping and equipment.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
Responding to the accident were emergency crews (fire and ambulance) from the town of Burns Harbour and the Division's internal plant protection forces
Release Type
Release Substance
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Source Category
References
References
CSB investigation, available (accessed 2July 2020) at https://www.csb.gov/bethlehem-steel-corporation-gas-condensate-fire/
From public part of MARS database