This event occurred when a hydrogen-carrying trailer was supplying hydrogen to a chemical plant. Instead of filling the hydrogen stationary storage, large quantities of hydrogen were transferred from the trailer into the compressed air plant network. The explosive atmosphere ignited in a compressed air consumer (a solid silo which was not containing hazardous materials).

This incident occurred when subcontractor two workers were widening air vents on the roof of a building hosting a tank containing hydrogen chloride solution. This intervention was necessary to to improve hydrogen venting from the tank storage area. The hydrogen gas was a by-product of the chlorine-making process. The two workers were operating an angle grinder, producing sparks which ignited the flammable atmosphere which evidently containing hydrogen. An explosion followed, with one casualty and one injured worker.

At approximately 8:45 a.m. an employee was troubleshooting a thermal chamber, evaluating a Hydrogen on Demand (HOD) unit. The chamber was reported inoperative that morning. Two units were being tested on a work bench and they were connected by an exhaust hose to an HOD inside the test chamber. The gas was not properly exhausted and began to back up into the hose that was attached to the HOD. The employee removed the side panel on the chamber and it exploded while he were standing in front of it. He was killed by the explosion.

A 9000 gal (34 m3) LH2 storage tank exploded during repair of the vent stack. Few days before the explosion, the tank had been filled with LH2, but later on the hydrogen released and ignited at the tank pressure control system, damaging the vent stack. To perform the required repairs, the tank had to be emptied. To this purpose the vessel was purged with nitrogen gas to display the LH2 by letting it boiling. However, the pressure inside the vacuum jacket increased because of the opening the vacuum valve. This pressure increase eventually led to the catastrophic tank rupture.

In 1987, well diggers had drilled a well for water, but had given up on one dry borehole at a depth of 108 meters. According to the source reported in the References, wind was coming out of the hole. When one driller peered into the hole while smoking a cigarette, the so-called wind exploded in his face. A huge fire followed, without smoke, looking bluish at daytime and colour and goldish at night. The crew needed weeks before being able to stop the fire and cap the well. The well remained capped until 2007, when well gas was analysed and revealed to consist in hydrogen with a purity of 98%.

The broke out at a hydrogen compressor of the reforming unit of the refinery. Following the safety procedures, the emergency stop of the unit was activated and the unit was decompressed using a safety flare. The emergency plan was kept for an hour. A security perimeter is in place. The isolation of the compressor was started automatically. The isolation of the discharge circuit was successful, but the suction circuit could only be partially closed due to a block of a valve. The operators then closed manually the suction valve, by removing the excess of grease that had been applied to it.

A fire broke out on a transformer transforming 225,000 V into 15,000 V in a metallurgical plant. This transformer supplies electrical power the site and to a neighbouring factory. In the following three hours, staff brought the fire under control with CO2 extinguishers, the internal emergency plan was activated, and the firefighters ventilated the premises and took readings of the flames using a thermal camera. Meanwhile, however, the shutdown of the electrical installation caused the stop of the operation of an electrolysis unit using zinc sulphate.

A fire broke out following a hydrogen leak on the cyclododecane unit in a chemical plant. A plume of smoke became visible outside the site. The fire was brought under control by putttng the unit in safe mode, implementing the internal resources available on site (monitor lance, sprinkler ring and extinguishers), and finally by the inervention of the internal firefighters. The staff was evacuated and the internal crisis unit triggered. The fire was extinguished in 30 minutes. The post-incident analysis revealed a hole in the connection of the vent manifold, upstream of the evacuation pipe.

Around 4 a.m., a major leak occurred at the outlet of the diesel hydrodesulfurization furnace in a refinery. The goal of this unit is to lower the sulfur content of diesel fuels produced in other units, by a catalytic reaction in the presence of hydrogen. At the moment of the leak the furnace was restarting. The alarms of the temperature sensors at the oven outlet were triggered. At 4:08 a.m., the operator shut down the hydrogen compressors and diesel charging pumps, closed the supply valves and called the emergency status. The first emergency operation was to decompress the unit.

This near miss occurred at the at an airport's hydrogen refilling station. Around 4:30 a.m., the hydrogen detector of the station was triggered and a sound and light alarm were activated. The hydrogen filling station was up in safe mode and the hydrogen storage system isolated. The connection pipes were purged via the vent and the power supply cut off. An on-call technician from the company in charge of managing the station arrived at 6:15 a.m., confirmed that the installation has been made safe and stopped the alarm. The leak was located on the compressors filter.