The incident occurred in a facility chrome-plating metals. At the time of the event, a metal roller was being chrome-plated. A short circuit occurred due to a defective contacting (contact rails) on the rectifier. This short circuit caused a spark to reach the surface of the electrolyte bath, and the spark ignited the hydrogen produced during chrome plating, causing an explosion.Various windows within the company were destroyed, but nobosy was injured.

The event occurred at the hydrogenation unit of a pharamceutical company. 145 kg of hydrogen were released the atmosphere at the gas circulation pump, due to a maintenance error . A specialist company (third-party company), had replaced the cylinder head of pump, but during assembly they did not re-isntalled the prescribed temperature sleeve for the thermometer (the temperature sleeve is the pressure-bearing element).

[NOTE: One source speak of a hydrogen gasometer, spanish news speak in general of gas, others of ntural gas or coal gas; considering the main product of the factory, it was chosen for this last version, but is is rather doubtful]This incident occurred at a coal gas storage (gasometer) system of a producer of foundry coke. The gasholder was a variable capacity tank, rising in height depending on the amount of gas stored, with a maximum capacity of 24,000 m3.Company sources said that the fire was caused as a result of a spark and a gas leak that was being repaired by the operators.

A lightning strike caused a voltage drop on the power supply of a chlorine-alkali plant using the mercury process.The emergency electrical system was activated, though restoring the external supply voltage in less than 200 ms rendered the entire system inconsistent; some units were operating normally, but all units connected to the emergency devices (including the mercury pump) remained idle. An explosive mix of 500 kg of chlorine and an unknown amount of hydrogen accumulated inside the low-pressure chlorine treatment circuit.

A fire broke out on a transformer transforming 225,000 V into 15,000 V in a metallurgical plant. This transformer supplies electrical power the site and to a neighbouring factory. In the following three hours, staff brought the fire under control with CO2 extinguishers, the internal emergency plan was activated, and the firefighters ventilated the premises and took readings of the flames using a thermal camera. Meanwhile, however, the shutdown of the electrical installation caused the stop of the operation of an electrolysis unit using zinc sulphate.

A fire broke out following a hydrogen leak on the cyclododecane unit in a chemical plant. A plume of smoke became visible outside the site. The fire was brought under control by putttng the unit in safe mode, implementing the internal resources available on site (monitor lance, sprinkler ring and extinguishers), and finally by the inervention of the internal firefighters. The staff was evacuated and the internal crisis unit triggered. The fire was extinguished in 30 minutes. The post-incident analysis revealed a hole in the connection of the vent manifold, upstream of the evacuation pipe.

This near miss occurred at metal smelting unit of a foundry. At 9:45 a.m., due to a power outage, the cooling pumps of two furnaces containing nickel and chromium stopped. One of the two furnaces was at the end of the smelting cycle. The temperature of the metal was 1300C. Due to the stop of the cooling system, water from the public network took over the cooling function, but was not efficient, causing the cooling coil to overheat.

a gas leakage (approximately 70% hydrogen, 21% nitrogen and the rest carbon monoxide and other impurities) occurred at the connection between a temperature measurement casing and a flange in the carbonization workshop cleaning tower. The leakage was reported to the plant leader, who issued the request to the workers to use iron cards and rubber plates to plug the leak. The operation failed and the leakage continued. At 17:00, at the request of the plant leader, the workers used a tire inner tube to wrap the leak.

A gas release occurred in the building for the recirculation of processes gas. The gas was a mixture of hydrogen and nitrogen. It occurred at the outlet valve, during works aiming to replace it. This caused the creation of an explosive gas mixture and the surrounding spaces. The defective valve has been identified several years before, its poor design and ageing caused the gas leakage. The ignition took place with 9 minutes delay after initial leakage.

The 10 m3 hydrogen storage tank at the hydrogen station belonging to the oxygen plant exploded during production operation. The hydrogen storage tank was installed and used by the plant in 1995, with a design pressure of 1,5 MPa, a volume of 10 m^3, a minimum wall thickness of 12 mm, a total length of 4576 mm (height) and an inner diameter of 1800 mm. After the explosion, there were no metal components left, except for the cement prefabricated foundation of the tank base.