Chemical Reaction Producing Hydrogen, Followed by an Explosion
The incident occurred in a pharmaceutical plant. A disk ruptured on the vent of a reactor and the reaction mixture was projected onto a frontage of the synthesis workshop. It caused a spill of 700 l of a mixture of monochlorobenzene (which is flammable liquid) and sodium borohydride (which is toxic). The plant operator manually activated the emergency response plan, evacuating the personnel. The internal emergency services set up a foam blanket on the spill, then carry out a water washing. The discharge valves were closed and the product was recovered in the fire retention basins. The site's response teams marked out the impacted area and took VOC measurements. Two hours later, the plant operator lifted the emergency response plan and set up a restriction zone around the building. Nine employees were slightly affected by odoursThe immediate cause was the formation of amount of hydrogen which could not be vented.
Event Date
November 6, 2019
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments
The immediate cause was the formation of amount of hydrogen which could not be vented. According to the ARIA source, the root causes of this event were identified as: (1) a lack of training of the operator carrying out the pouring, (2) an inaccuracy on the manufacturing sheet as to the flow rate of pouring and (3) safety barriers rendered ineffective by the foaming phenomenon.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
chemical reactor, monochlorobenzene and sodium borohydride
Location Type
Location description
Industrial Area
Currency
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
Before restarting, the following actions were taken: (1) improvement of procedures: modification of the manufacturing sheet to specify the pouring rate;(2) Selection of experienced operators to perform this operation;(3) passive safety barrier: resizing the orifice restrictor on the propionic acid supply pipe to limit the pouring rate.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
Unknown
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Source Category
References
References
Event description no 55265 in the French database ARIA (accessed October 2021)