This incident occurred when subcontractor two workers were widening air vents on the roof of a building hosting a tank containing hydrogen chloride solution. This intervention was necessary to to improve hydrogen venting from the tank storage area. The hydrogen gas was a by-product of the chlorine-making process. The two workers were operating an angle grinder, producing sparks which ignited the flammable atmosphere which evidently containing hydrogen. An explosion followed, with one casualty and one injured worker.

In 1987, well diggers had drilled a well for water, but had given up on one dry borehole at a depth of 108 meters. According to the source reported in the References, wind was coming out of the hole. When one driller peered into the hole while smoking a cigarette, the so-called wind exploded in his face. A huge fire followed, without smoke, looking bluish at daytime and colour and goldish at night. The crew needed weeks before being able to stop the fire and cap the well. The well remained capped until 2007, when well gas was analysed and revealed to consist in hydrogen with a purity of 98%.

A fire broke out on a transformer transforming 225,000 V into 15,000 V in a metallurgical plant. This transformer supplies electrical power the site and to a neighbouring factory. In the following three hours, staff brought the fire under control with CO2 extinguishers, the internal emergency plan was activated, and the firefighters ventilated the premises and took readings of the flames using a thermal camera. Meanwhile, however, the shutdown of the electrical installation caused the stop of the operation of an electrolysis unit using zinc sulphate.

This near miss occurred at metal smelting unit of a foundry. At 9:45 a.m., due to a power outage, the cooling pumps of two furnaces containing nickel and chromium stopped. One of the two furnaces was at the end of the smelting cycle. The temperature of the metal was 1300C. Due to the stop of the cooling system, water from the public network took over the cooling function, but was not efficient, causing the cooling coil to overheat.

[NOTE: the attribution to hydrogen formation as cause of the explosion is 'probable 'but not fully demonstrated].Two explosions in two different sprinkler systems occurred, wit the same assumed cause.The first occurred at the premises of a company, where a service engineer was injured, even though the explosion actually moved out into the open air. The second occurred in the department store, where an installation contractor was burned because an explosion occurred in a large pressure storage tank in a small room with the result that the explosion was particularly powerful.

During the shipments of incinerator bottom ash, flammable gasses including hydrogen generated and caused two explosions. The first explosion was in the forecastle store and the second in the cargo hold.The vessel was loaded with a cargo of 2333 tonnes of unprocessed incinerator bottom ash. The chief engineer, who was inside the forecastle store at the time, suffered second degree burns and was airlifted to a nearby hospital.

Hydrogen leak due to a fault with non-process related battery equipment.After reporting the hydrogen leak, fire crews have been called to a gas terminal. The leak was due to a fault with non-process related battery equipment.

At least one person was injured in an explosion at a theatre building. The investigation concluded that the accident has been caused by hydrogen entering the sprinkler room from the sprinkler piping, during maintenance of the building's sprinkler system. Together with indoor air, it formed a flammable mix of hydrogen gas and air. it is known that hydrogen forms in pipes due to corrosion of the pipe internal zinc coating by oxygen and water. The investigation could not identify the exact cause of the ignition.

An explosion and fire occurred at a 3000-gallon (approx. 11400 l) reactor, part of the production process of linear alkyl benzene (LAB), Process materials released from the various vessels and piping fuelled a subsequent fire that took approximately 2 hours to extinguish.As reported by Ali Reza (Ali Reza et al., 2007, see References), before the explosion, the bottom of the reactor was plugged with approximately 180 gallons (approx. 800 l) of a sludge-like mixture of coarse aluminum powder, aluminum chloride and various hydrocarbons.

The incident occurred in a pharmaceutical plant. A disk ruptured on the vent of a reactor and the reaction mixture was projected onto a frontage of the synthesis workshop. It caused a spill of 700 l of a mixture of monochlorobenzene (which is flammable liquid) and sodium borohydride (which is toxic). The plant operator manually activated the emergency response plan, evacuating the personnel. The internal emergency services set up a foam blanket on the spill, then carry out a water washing. The discharge valves were closed and the product was recovered in the fire retention basins.