The event occurred at the hydrogenation unit of a pharamceutical company. 145 kg of hydrogen were released the atmosphere at the gas circulation pump, due to a maintenance error . A specialist company (third-party company), had replaced the cylinder head of pump, but during assembly they did not re-isntalled the prescribed temperature sleeve for the thermometer (the temperature sleeve is the pressure-bearing element).

The FCEV was travelling at approx. 75 km/h (80 km/h speed limit) on a straight, downhill part of the road. Another vehicles was waiting at a STOP sign on the right side, did not see the incoming FCEV and drove into the road at the moment of the FEV passing. The second vehicle hit the FCEV on the back right side. There were only body parts damaged and no hydrogen was released. There was no oil or other fluid spillage and no people were injured.The diagnostic system of the FCEV did not issue any alarm, and there were no warning lights to indicate a problem with the hydrogen systems on-board.

At approximately 8:45 a.m. an employee was troubleshooting a thermal chamber, evaluating a Hydrogen on Demand (HOD) unit. The chamber was reported inoperative that morning. Two units were being tested on a work bench and they were connected by an exhaust hose to an HOD inside the test chamber. The gas was not properly exhausted and began to back up into the hose that was attached to the HOD. The employee removed the side panel on the chamber and it exploded while he were standing in front of it. He was killed by the explosion.

A 9000 gal (34 m3) LH2 storage tank exploded during repair of the vent stack. Few days before the explosion, the tank had been filled with LH2, but later on the hydrogen released and ignited at the tank pressure control system, damaging the vent stack. To perform the required repairs, the tank had to be emptied. To this purpose the vessel was purged with nitrogen gas to display the LH2 by letting it boiling. However, the pressure inside the vacuum jacket increased because of the opening the vacuum valve. This pressure increase eventually led to the catastrophic tank rupture.

The broke out at a hydrogen compressor of the reforming unit of the refinery. Following the safety procedures, the emergency stop of the unit was activated and the unit was decompressed using a safety flare. The emergency plan was kept for an hour. A security perimeter is in place. The isolation of the compressor was started automatically. The isolation of the discharge circuit was successful, but the suction circuit could only be partially closed due to a block of a valve. The operators then closed manually the suction valve, by removing the excess of grease that had been applied to it.

A fire broke out following a hydrogen leak on the cyclododecane unit in a chemical plant. A plume of smoke became visible outside the site. The fire was brought under control by putttng the unit in safe mode, implementing the internal resources available on site (monitor lance, sprinkler ring and extinguishers), and finally by the inervention of the internal firefighters. The staff was evacuated and the internal crisis unit triggered. The fire was extinguished in 30 minutes. The post-incident analysis revealed a hole in the connection of the vent manifold, upstream of the evacuation pipe.

This near miss occurred at metal smelting unit of a foundry. At 9:45 a.m., due to a power outage, the cooling pumps of two furnaces containing nickel and chromium stopped. One of the two furnaces was at the end of the smelting cycle. The temperature of the metal was 1300C. Due to the stop of the cooling system, water from the public network took over the cooling function, but was not efficient, causing the cooling coil to overheat.

A hydrogen leak took place on a trailer carrying compressed hydrogen, located inside the fenced perimeter of a hydrogen station. According to the company managing the hydrogen delivery and refuelling station, the leak did not pose any risk to people or the environment. A preliminary assessment identified a faulty valve s source of the leak, but t was unclear a that time if it was a single defect or a systemic (i.e. design) problem.

a gas leakage (approximately 70% hydrogen, 21% nitrogen and the rest carbon monoxide and other impurities) occurred at the connection between a temperature measurement casing and a flange in the carbonization workshop cleaning tower. The leakage was reported to the plant leader, who issued the request to the workers to use iron cards and rubber plates to plug the leak. The operation failed and the leakage continued. At 17:00, at the request of the plant leader, the workers used a tire inner tube to wrap the leak.

The day before the incident, the outlet pipe connected to methanation reactor started leaking gas, which contains hydrogen. The leak was temporarily eliminated by a pressurised plug. On the day of the incident, the pipe leaked again, and the same plugging method was still used to stop the leak. This occurred without shutting down the unit and taking safety measures. Approximately one hour later, a sudden explosion occurred at the inlet line of the methanation reactor.