The incident occurred in a facility chrome-plating metals. At the time of the event, a metal roller was being chrome-plated. A short circuit occurred due to a defective contacting (contact rails) on the rectifier. This short circuit caused a spark to reach the surface of the electrolyte bath, and the spark ignited the hydrogen produced during chrome plating, causing an explosion.Various windows within the company were destroyed, but nobosy was injured.

A leak occurred at a of a liquid withdrawal valve of a liquid hydrogen storage tank. The hydrogen escaped at the flange between the valve body and the upper part of the valve (flange with tongue and groove). 40 kg of hydrogen were lost.The accidental release was due to the use of bolts different from those prescribed. By using the wrong ones (old bolts), the bolt material was able to flow at the specified tighteningtorque. This meant that there was insufficient tightening torque, which led to a leak.

The event occurred at the hydrogenation unit of a pharamceutical company. 145 kg of hydrogen were released the atmosphere at the gas circulation pump, due to a maintenance error . A specialist company (third-party company), had replaced the cylinder head of pump, but during assembly they did not re-isntalled the prescribed temperature sleeve for the thermometer (the temperature sleeve is the pressure-bearing element).

This event occurred when a hydrogen-carrying trailer was supplying hydrogen to a chemical plant. Instead of filling the hydrogen stationary storage, large quantities of hydrogen were transferred from the trailer into the compressed air plant network. The explosive atmosphere ignited in a compressed air consumer (a solid silo which was not containing hazardous materials).

The FCEV was travelling at approx. 75 km/h (80 km/h speed limit) on a straight, downhill part of the road. Another vehicles was waiting at a STOP sign on the right side, did not see the incoming FCEV and drove into the road at the moment of the FEV passing. The second vehicle hit the FCEV on the back right side. There were only body parts damaged and no hydrogen was released. There was no oil or other fluid spillage and no people were injured.The diagnostic system of the FCEV did not issue any alarm, and there were no warning lights to indicate a problem with the hydrogen systems on-board.

The fire developed on a hydrogen bus during filling, and was detected due to the development of smoke and a smell of burned materials.The power cable of the compressor had overheated. Two are the possible causes: (1) the cable had been wrongly installed or fixed, or (2) the electrical system had caused too high current in the cable. The corrective actions have been:(a) To ship the affected component to the manufacturing company for inspection(b) To replacement of the affected component with a new one. (c) To perform an inspection of the system on all the other buses in function.