At about 9:50 a.m., a lightning strike ignited hydrogen exiting a stack in a chemical factory. This hydrogen, produced by the chlorine electrolysis cells, is conveyed to the stack when the manufacturing shop that consumes it is shut down. The internal emergency plan was activated. The electrolysis chain was put into minimal operation mode. Nitrogen and steam were injected into the stack, which was cooled by in-house first responders. The situation was brought under control at 10:30 a.m.

The accident took place in a tank-type pressurised separator on the synthesis gas line of an ammonia production plant. The pressurised separator operates at nominal values of 25 bar and 5C. It contains a mixture of hydrogen and nitrogen (75%/25%). It is located slightly upstream of the synthesis gas compressor (on the low pressure side) that was shut down. The connector connecting the separator to its level measuring instrument is located outside, near the building containing the compressors.

A frontal road collision between a truck transporting pressurised hydrogen gas and a carBoth vehicles were projected into the fields, on each side of the road. No leakage of hydrogen gas was observed (10:35). The driver of the truck injured his shoulder, and the driver of the car suffered from multiple fractures, they were taken to the hospital.First slowed down for several hours, the traffic was finally cut between 16:00 and 20:00 pm to allow the authorities to unload the truck. The trailer was then escorted by the gendarmes to the nearest town.

In a plastics production plant, a pallet containing 7 cylinders of nitrogen and 1 cylinder of hydrogen fell from a truck traveling in a logistics zone. The driver stopped the vehicle, cut off the engine and noticed a leak on the hydrogen cylinder; he warned his superintendent who alerted the firefighters, established a safety perimeter and interrupted any work with hot sources.The firefighters stopped the leak by closing the cylinder valve and put the basket back on the truck which was then unloaded at the place originally planned.

The utility production facilities (electricity, water, air, and steam) at a refinery were isolated from the power grid and switched to two turbine generators in anticipation of a storm. At 9:50 p.m., both turbine generators shut down at the same time. Deprived of the necessary water and air, the boilers and all the production units entered a safe state. 1. The effluents drained from the stopped units were sent to detention ponds. 2. The gases were directed to the flare stack. A leak of burning hydrogen and petrol occurred in one of the units.

In a petrochemical plant, a gas mixture at 270 bar made of 75% hydrogen (H2) and 25% methane (CH4) leaked through the bottom valve of a dryer of a resin production unit. After detection of the leak, the explosive zone near the equipment was estimated to be 7 m. Hydrogen sulfide (H2S) was detected around the leak. The installation was shutdown and depressurised, a nitrogen injection used to neutralise the gas mixture. The emergency plan was called at 13:35, and terminated at 16:40. The pressure in the dryer had dropped to 34 bar.

An explosion and fire occurred at around at a solid hydrogen storage company. The accident occurred while a press used to compact magnesium hydride and natural graphite into pellets was being reassembled following maintenance. The manufacturing of the pellets created dust inside the vacuum chamber. This dust built up on various areas of the press (bellows, front and rear of the press, valve, stripper, inside of the airlock and dispenser). To prevent excess powder build-up, the press was cleaned three times a day at the end of each shift.

At 11:15 pm, an explosion followed by fire occurred in the vicinity of the measurement transformer on an isolated 90,000 V electrical oil transformer at a plant manufacturing technical polymers. Plant personnel placed the installations in safe operating mode, while the backup line and 15,000 V transformer were activated, in coordination with the electric grid operator to keep the sites supply lines open. The risk of falling electrical cables led to closing the adjacent departmental highway, and the emergency crew installed a protective fire hose.

The explosion, accompanied by abundant black smoke, occurred at 8:50. An ignited leak of hydrogen (H2) in the ammonia production unit (NH3) had spread to the pressure circuit carrying synthesis gas (mixture of nitrogen N2, H2 and NH3 already synthesized). The 7 operators operated the emergency stop and evacuated the unit (risk of toxic leak) to the fall-back zone (reinforced control room). The plant operator triggered the emergency plan around 9:15, alerted the public rescue service and the crisis unit of the prefecture.

The fire was in a polyamide production chemical plant classified SEVESODuring maintenance of an isolated unit producing a polyamide monomer (LACTAME), a fire developed on the ground floor of the unit of hydrogenation of cyclo-dodecadiene (CDA). A fire detector on the unit triggered an alarm 4 min after the fire started and the station operator put the unit in safe conditions and alerted the firefighters of the site. The fire was controlled after a half an hour.