Employee #2 was using a torch to cut a U-bolt on the bypass piping next to a brine surge tank that potentially contained hydrogen gas in a vapour space in the upper portion of the tank. His job was to remove and replace the brine line that was connected to the top of the tank. Just before the accident, Employee #1 was on top of the tank unbolting the brine line. He was launched into the air by an explosion and struck against some piping or other structure, He was killed. Employee #2 was struck by piping and knocked backward. His head struck a curb and he was injured.

Three workers were working in the sulfur recovery unit (SRU), trying to restore the hydrogen flow. The workers were trying to isolate the cause of a flow problem: hydrogen was entering the regulators at 200 psi (14 bar), but the pressure was dropping to 18 to 20 psi (approximately 1.3 bar) after the passed through the various components of the unit. They closed a valve preceding the regulators and vented the bleed manifold before removing a flange located beyond the valve. One of the worker then re-opened the closed valve to check the flow.

Employees were refilling a rack of 15 hydrogen cylinders that were connected together on a steel pallet with railings. A leak developed at a valve and the pressurized hydrogen ignited. Operations activated a deluge sprinkler system, which turned off the compressor that was pumping in hydrogen. The fire was contained by the sprinkler system as the hydrogen pressure bled off. There were no injuries.

Five barrels of aluminum dust that had been removed from an outdoor dust collector were sealed and stored in the plant adjacent to electrical panels. One of them had somehow been contaminated with water, which exothermically reacted with the aluminum dust to form hydrogen gas. The top of the barrel deformed and glowed red. Smoke was observed and an employee sounded a vocal alarm. The lid blew off the barrel and the mushroom cloud of aluminum dust exploded in a fireball. Nearby combustible material ignited and the sprinkler system activated.

An employee was preparing a batch of glycol stearate emulsifier in a vessel. Upon completion of product, the quality control lab reported that the pH was too high and the product needed to be bleached. When the employee reached the step of adding the sodium borohydride, he decided to relieve the pressure in the vessel by opening the valve used to introduce sodium chlorite. As he opened the valve, sodium chlorite (liquid) residue discharged, spraying the grating and the plastic bucket which contained sodium borohydride.

Employee #1, a maintenance worker, was killed by a hydrogen blast while working inside a batch hydrogenation unit.

The accident started with a leakage of distilled petroleum intermediate and hydrogen in the desulfurization unit of the distilled intermediate. Both substances ignited and exploded, with a later fire, in the form of a pool fire and a jet flame from a pipe.The initial gravity of the event gave rise to the activation of the External Emergency Plan.

Ignition of hydrogen produced by washing slag in a tank for chlorosulfonic acid.

Explosion due to injection of hydrogen into a furnace containing residual air.

Hydrogen gas leaking from drain pipes in a hydrodesulfurization plant: There was a hydrodesulfurisation plant which had a recycle hydrogen compressor fitted with a suction rectifier. Hydrogen gas gushed out through a hole made by corrosion at the drain pipe on the suction rectifier. The process condition (45C and 3.7Mpa) made atmosphere causing hydrogen sulfide-ammonia corrosion in the drain pipe which consisted of about 10m horizontal parts and an upward outlet. This upward outlet made it impossible to drain out completely. Furthermore, steam insulation also contributed to the corrosion.