The FCEV was travelling at approx. 75 km/h (80 km/h speed limit) on a straight, downhill part of the road. Another vehicles was waiting at a STOP sign on the right side, did not see the incoming FCEV and drove into the road at the moment of the FEV passing. The second vehicle hit the FCEV on the back right side. There were only body parts damaged and no hydrogen was released. There was no oil or other fluid spillage and no people were injured.The diagnostic system of the FCEV did not issue any alarm, and there were no warning lights to indicate a problem with the hydrogen systems on-board.

The fire developed on a hydrogen bus during filling, and was detected due to the development of smoke and a smell of burned materials.The power cable of the compressor had overheated. Two are the possible causes: (1) the cable had been wrongly installed or fixed, or (2) the electrical system had caused too high current in the cable. The corrective actions have been:(a) To ship the affected component to the manufacturing company for inspection(b) To replacement of the affected component with a new one. (c) To perform an inspection of the system on all the other buses in function.

The accidental hydrogen release occurred when testing the storage system connected to a PEM electrolyzer. The leak test consisted in filling the storage with hydrogen at step-wise increase of pressure. After the step at 3 bar (0.3 MPa), which did not reveal any leak, the storage was pressurised up to 5 bar (0.5 MPa). At that moment a hissing sound occurred from the storage at the outside of the building indicating a leak.

The incident involves a gas booster provided by a manufacturer. This device is used in the experimental platform of the project to raise the pressure in pipelines from 60 to 80 barg (from 6 to 8 MPa), allowing the gas to flow in a close loop. After 5 weeks of operation, a critical gas leakage through the vent port was detected.At the moment of the incident, the compressor was working with a mixture of hydrogen and methane (H2/CH4 blend 20/80 %v/%v). The booster was sent to the manufacturer for inspection and reparation. Severe damage in the seals of the vent port was found.

This incident occurred at the electrolyzer of a refuelling station. An employee of the electrolyzers manufacturer was on-site to conduct a reset of the plant power breaker system and to restart gas generation. Whilst putting the system into generation, a loud bang was heard. By reviewing the station CCTV evidence, a cloud of water vapour was seen being emitted from the oxygen vent line of the electrolyzer container. The gas generation system was safely shut down, and an investigation was started to understand the cause and potential impacts.

The 10 m3 hydrogen storage tank at the hydrogen station belonging to the oxygen plant exploded during production operation. The hydrogen storage tank was installed and used by the plant in 1995, with a design pressure of 1,5 MPa, a volume of 10 m^3, a minimum wall thickness of 12 mm, a total length of 4576 mm (height) and an inner diameter of 1800 mm. After the explosion, there were no metal components left, except for the cement prefabricated foundation of the tank base.

A gas mixture (25% nitrogen, 73% of hydrogen, 2% methane) leaked, due to the ejection of the check valve from its connection with the inlet pipe. A large amount of the gas mixed with air and ignited, probably due to sparks generated by the ejected check hitting a metal pipe. It followed an explosion. Its pressure wave hit a gas pipeline causing its fracture and a fire. After about 1 hour and 30 minutes the fire was under control. The shockwave from the explosion caused a gas pipe at the back of the workshop to crack and leak, causing a large fire.

The day before the incident, the outlet pipe connected to methanation reactor started leaking gas, which contains hydrogen. The leak was temporarily eliminated by a pressurised plug. On the day of the incident, the pipe leaked again, and the same plugging method was still used to stop the leak. This occurred without shutting down the unit and taking safety measures. Approximately one hour later, a sudden explosion occurred at the inlet line of the methanation reactor.

the explosion occurred inside the lower hydrogenation tower of a hydrogen peroxide unit, damaging the distribution tray inside the tower. 4 were killed and 2 injured, the direct economic loss was 488.2 million yuan. The hydrogenation tower is part of the hydrogen peroxide plant.

The vessel affected by the incident was a gas storage used for the desulfurisation process. The desulfurization gas had high hydrogen content. The vessels had cracks in the upper transverse fillet welds at the gas inlet which caused low stress brittle fractures. The cracks had been found during the maintenance, but not fixed. This eventually caused a gas release. Approximately 2.5 hours after that a leak was detected and reported, a first explosion occurred.