Hydrogen/Methane Release at a Gas Booster of a Pipeline
The incident involves a gas booster provided by a manufacturer. This device is used in the experimental platform of the project to raise the pressure in pipelines from 60 to 80 barg (from 6 to 8 MPa), allowing the gas to flow in a close loop. After 5 weeks of operation, a critical gas leakage through the vent port was detected.At the moment of the incident, the compressor was working with a mixture of hydrogen and methane (H2/CH4 blend 20/80 %v/%v). The booster was sent to the manufacturer for inspection and reparation. Severe damage in the seals of the vent port was found. Besides, the gas barrels were scratched. Both seals and gas barrels had to be replaced.The reason for this failure is unclear and the manufacturer cannot provide a real solution. The booster must have been able to perform 2,000,000 cycles without premature deterioration of the seals, but failed after 500,000 cycles.No consequences on people or property. Minor damage of environment because of release of greenhouse gases (methane)
Event Date
November 10, 2021
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments
The immediate cause of the release was the was the severe damage of the seals of the vent port, which occurred during operation. The manufacturer could not provide a root cause of the damage. The operator concluded that a manufacturing defect seems the most logical explanation for the failure. They also suspect that the manufacturer is reluctant to admit it, because the spare parts used after the reparation were the same as those originally installed.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
booster
Storage/Process Medium
Storage/Process Quantity
7
Storage/Process Units
Location Type
Location description
Unknown
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
The device was new and had not been used previously. The event occurred during a planned operation (the first experimental campaign).
Consequences
Number of Injured Persons
2
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
As corrective action, the seals and the gas barrels were replaced by the manufacturer. The facility operator is considering changing the booster manufacturer, for the following reasons: (1) It appeared that the booster is not suitable for working with hydrogen / methane blends, especially in closed setups, because they are not tight enough.(2) Manufacturer after-sale service was not reliable. Also, they did not provide sufficient information on the cause of failure.(3) The communication with the manufacturer is in general difficult, slow and requests are often ignored.(4) Manufacturer factory is in the UK, and since the BREXIT supplies are stopped at the custom too long, which makes finding quick solutions even more difficult.A general conclusion could be that problems related to suppliers - projects relationship can generate safety issues.
Release Type
Release Substance
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
20.00
Release Rate (kg/s)
48.00
Release Amount (kg)
0.50
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Source Category
References
References
Own report available but confidential