An explosion followed by a fire occurred at a tar precipitator of gas treatment of a coke oven. The extractors were manually activated. Ten minutes later, the operator activates the internal emergency plan. The fuel supply to the installation was interrupted. Approximately two hours later the fire was extinguished by nitrogen inerting. The operator estimated the maximum amount of material that reacted in the explosion of the tar precipitator at 170 kg in TNT equivalent.

The accident occurred at a production, distribution and storage station for hydrogen city busses. After filling the hydrogen cylinders of a bus, the hydrogen detection system of the bus triggered an alarm. The site technician pushed the emergency button and the station was put in safety mode. The technician in charge of filling disconnected the hydrogen hose that connects the station to the bus. The maintenance manager of the bus manufacturer was alerted and arrived 20 minutes later and evacuated the personnel. They closed the valves of the on-board storage system.

During agricultural drainage work carried out by a farmer, an explosion occurred on a hydrogen pipeline located in a field. Flames several meters high were visible and two houses were evacuated. A safety perimeter was set up. The pipeline operator applied procedures to ensure the safety of the local residents and the pipeline.The damaged pipe was listed by the operator. The farmer did not declare the work site and no verification was done before starting the work.[ARIA event 57406]

An implosion/explosion occurred on a furnace in a company of copper metallurgy. The incident occurred at the end of the production cycle, when the furnace bell is lifted at the end of the cooling process. The operator in charge of the lifting was thrown away and slightly burned in the face. The victim was evacuated and the emergency services were alerted. The building structures (windows, doors, roof) experienced serious damage. The power supply was switched off.

A fire developed on a tube trailer transporting 330 kg of compressed hydrogen, while travelling on a highway. The fire was due to a pressure relief valve of a tube releasing hydrogen. The flames reached 10 to 20 m. The fire brigades were able to extinguish the file in 30 minutes.The truck had left a plant of hydrogen production and storage to deliver to a refuelling station. The probable origin of the incident is a fire on the tyres of the truck, which caused the overheating of the tubes, the increase of the internal pressure and the consequent opening of the pressure relief valve.

At around 9:15 a.m., during a routine inspection, a flame was observed at the bottom flange of a reactor in a refinery. A few moments later, sensors near the leak detected a rise in temperature.The facility was shut down in accordance with emergency procedures. The sprinkler system was triggered to protect the equipment. The rapid decompression of the plant towards the safety flare reduced the leak flow rapidly. At 10:12 am, the fire was extinguished.

The incident occurred in a pharmaceutical plant. A disk ruptured on the vent of a reactor and the reaction mixture was projected onto a frontage of the synthesis workshop. It caused a spill of 700 l of a mixture of monochlorobenzene (which is flammable liquid) and sodium borohydride (which is toxic). The plant operator manually activated the emergency response plan, evacuating the personnel. The internal emergency services set up a foam blanket on the spill, then carry out a water washing. The discharge valves were closed and the product was recovered in the fire retention basins.

A leak occurred while loading a semi-trailer carrying hydrogen gas cylinders. An employee closed the supply valve but the leak ignited and reached the trailer's tires. The vehicle caught fire, causing a plume of black smoke visible from a distance. The plant operator evacuated the personnel and activated the emergency response plan. The water sprayers in the filling station and the site was shut down. The firemen and the operator prevented the spread of the fire beyond the 3 semi-trailers parked at the loading station. After approximately 2 hours, the firemen brought the fire under control.

The leak occurred at the hydro-isomerisation unit of a refinery. Following the observation of a pressure drop between two heat exchangers, controls were carried out on site. A noise was heard, but no gas detection was activated on the unit. A hydrogen leak was detected but the source was not identified. Following the detection of hydrogen, the access to the unit was forbidden and emergency services and the fire department alerted. The unit was decompressed using the safety flare. When the pressure was sufficiently reduced, two operators looked for the origin of the leak.

During a work tour on a refinery, an employee noticed a fire at the level of a flange at the inlet of the grille of an exchanger, located at the outlet of a reactor of the catalytic reforming unit.The plant operator detected a lack of uniformity of torque on the bolts. Two years ago, during a shutdown period, some parts of the exchanger had been removed for inspection. The flange on the heat exchanger side was not easily accessible. On reassembly, the presence of a pipe tee near the flange made it difficult to tighten with a bolting machine.