Steam Reformer Explosion at a Oil Production Plant
The event occurred just after that start-up steam was introduced into the reformer furnace inlet. At this moment an very high pressure and a single loud bang was reported by the operations personnel on the furnace structure. An emergency shutdown of the furnace was initiated and the start up aborted. At the time of the incident there were 7 people on the furnace. Four were operations staff plus three maintenance personnel.
Event Date
January 30, 2005
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The immediate cause was accidental injection of remnant water into the furnace. The root causes were related to organization aspects such as inappropriate safety design risk, (see lesson learned)
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
steam reformer, furnace inlet
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational Condition
Pre-event Summary
The plant had been shutdown and the reformer furnace isolated, to perform maintenance work. After the replacement of 6 damaged tubes, the start-up procedure was initiated: it consists in heating furnace up to 350oC (662oF), then introducing 4136 kPa (600 psig) of steam into the radiant tubes, rising the furnace temperature is increased until 500oC (932oF), feeding the methane and finally bringing the unit on line for the production of hydrogen. The event occurred just after that start-up steam was introduced into the reformer furnace inlet. At the time of the incident there were 7 people on the furnace. Four were operations staff plus three maintenance personnel.
Post-event Summary
Various windows within the company were destroyed. The rectifier had to be repaired and tested.
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
The lessons learned as from the referred report of M. Rogers listed the following issues:1. Inadequate Safeguards 2. Inadequate Procedure3. Lack of Management of Change4. Non-essential Personnel
Event Nature
Emergency Action
Unknown
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Source Category
References
References
Mike Rogers, Lessons Learned From an Unusual Hydrogen Reformer Furnace Failure
Canadian Society of Chemical Enigneers 2005
https://www.cheminst.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/Rogers20-20CSChE2020…
(accessed August 2020)
CBC News
http://www.cbc.ca/cp/business/050201/b0201158.html
(accessed 2016)