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This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Hydrogen Cylinders Explosion at a Power Plant
[NOTE: the sources are not completely clear in describing the system involved in this incident ; the following is the most plausible option according to HIAD validator]The explosion happened in two hydrogen tanks ('receivers') whcih were receiving and storing hydrogen produced by a water electrolyzer via two compressors. The hydrogen was then supplyed to a further non-specified generator. The plant had been shut down on August 24 to 26 and resumed the hydrogen production and storage on August 27. On August 28, after that the tanks had supplied hydrogen to the generator for 20 hours, the hydrogen purity in the generator dropped suddenly to 85%. The two tanks were disconnected for hydrogen purity sampling and the generator was further supplied with standard hydrogen bottles. The quality check indicated a purity of 95%. One of the two tanks was then re-connected to the electrolyzer after approximately 7 hours. Again, the purity in the generator indicated 85% hydrogen purity. 20 minutes later, both tanks exploded, resulting in two fatalities, 18 injured by fragments and extensive blast damage in a 100 m radius. An investigation from the incident reported that all the gas supplied to the receiver over a 20-hours period had been air. The explosion has been assessed at TNT equivalent 275 kg.
Event Date
August 28, 1992
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The immediate cause was the erroneous and undetected supply of air to hydrogen tanks. The investigation report is confidential and not available, however one of the source reported preliminary findings. Although the exact root cause(s) could not be identified, the report speaks of water in the electrolyzer tank connections due to water rings compressor. The operative schemes were cumbersome and counter-intuitive, some of the existent safe guards were deactivated, and the personnel had no knowledge of the hydrogen physical and combustion properties. No sign of a HAZOP study.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
hydrogen cylinders
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
Industrial Area
Event Nature
Emergency Action
Unknown
Release Type
Release Substance
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
100.00
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Source Category
References
References

Prof. J. Lee presentation at 1st European Summer School on Hydrogen Safety (ESSH)
available at the HySafe project site
http://www.hysafe.org/science/eAcademy/php/1stesshsprogram.php
(see slides from 13 to 15, accessed October 2020)

South China Morning Post news of 8 Aug. 1993:
https://www.scmp.com/article/39587/report-reveals-list-errors?module=pe…
(accessed August 2023)

HAZARDOUS CARGO BULLETIN INCIDENT LOG, 1992, OCT.
This source is not available anymore.
The HCB site goes back only to 2008 (accessed October 2020)

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