Hydrogen Bottles Truck Crash and Hydrogen Release
Since the release could not be stopped by intervening at the leaking point, the fire brigade decided to vent the whole content of the pallet (246 m3) by gradually opening the valves and by keeping the rack cool. The rack of the bottles was empty after four hours and the rescue operation ends at noon after the cylinder rack has been checked by an expert from the gas supply company. The residents returned to their homes and the plant's activity restarted one hour later.
Event Date
October 27, 2008
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments
The immediate cause was the mechanical damage of one of the compressed hydrogen cylinders, by an erroneous maneuvering of the operator .
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
compressed hydrogen storage, cylinders pallet
Storage/Process Medium
Storage/Process Quantity
24
Actual Pressure
200
Design Pressure
200
Location Type
Location description
Industrial Area
Pre-event Summary
The accident took place when replacing the empty cylinders with full ones.
Currency
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
The ARIA report (see references) does not mention any corrective action following the incident, but improved (safer) loading/unloading procedure would certainly be required.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
Since the leak could not be stopped locally, The fire brigade decided to drain the whole content of the pallet (246 m3) by gradually opening the valves and by keeping the rack cool. The rack of the bottles was empty after four hours and the rescue operation ends at noon after the cylinder rack has been checked by an expert from the gas supply company. The residents returned to their homes and the plant's activity restarted one hour later.
Emergency Evaluation
A specialized expert emergency support cell estimated the leakage rate at 0.48 kg/s. They also estimated the distance to the Low flammability limit (LFL) about 30 m and the effects of an explosion in the event of delayed ignition of the cloud in the open air at 50 and 20 mbar over-pressure, for respectively 80 and 130 m.
Release Type
Release Substance
Hydrogen Release Concentration (%)
100.00
Release Rate (kg/s)
0.50
Release Amount (kg)
36.00
Hole Shape
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Source Category
References
References
Event description in the French database ARIA
https://www.aria.developpement-durable.gouv.fr/accident/35405/
(accessed October 2020)