Skip to main content

This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Hydrogen Accidental Formation and Ignition at a Spent Fuel Cask of a Nuclear Power Plant
Hydrogen ignition during welding on a VSC-24 spent fuel cask Pursuant to 10 CFR 72.210 - fuel in an independent spent fuel storage installation at its Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant. The inspection of activities conducted under that general license, found that the weight of the multi-assembly sealed basket (MSB) shield lid was not appropriately translated from the safety analysis report into several procedures and there was an inadequate procedure for placing the MSB transfer cask into the spent fuel pool. In addition to these findings, it was determined that the use of Carbo Zinc 11 paint, in a borated water environment was not properly assessed by you and your vendor, Sierra Nuclear Corporation. The paint generates hydrogen in a borated water environment and adequate controls to deal with the hydrogen were not provided. Several opportunities to identify the generation of hydrogen during previous cask loading operations had been missed. Finally, a safety evaluation was not performed for improperly sized rigging utilized for lowering the MSB into the ventilated concrete cask, and a safety evaluation for weighing the MSB shield lid while in place was not adequate. These violations of the requirements of 10 CFR Part 72 represent a breakdown in control of licensed activities associated with dry cask storage activities and have been classified in the aggregate in accordance with the Enforcement Policy, as a Severity Level III problem.
Event Date
May 22, 1996
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
Immediate cause of hydrogen generation was the Carbo Zinc 11 paint in a borated water environment paint.Root cause analysis revealed a lack of risk management.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
spent fuel storage installation
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational Condition
Currency
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
According to the report of the U.S. NRC, the following deficiencies were found:1. The risk was not properly assessed by you and your vendor, Sierra Nuclear Corporation. It was determined that the use of Carbo Zinc 11 paint, generates hydrogen in a borated water environment 2. Adequate controls to deal with the hydrogen were not provided. 3. Several opportunities to identify the generation of hydrogen during previous cask loading operations had been missed. 4. Finally, a safety evaluation was not performed for improperly sized rigging utilized for lowering the MSB into the ventilated concrete cask, and a safety evaluation for weighing the MSB shield lid while in place was not adequate.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
Unknown
Release Type
Release Substance
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Source Category
References
We are professional and reliable provider since we offer customers the most powerful and beautiful themes. Besides, we always catch the latest technology and adapt to follow world’s new trends to deliver the best themes to the market.

Contact info

We are the leaders in the building industries and factories. We're word wide. We never give up on the challenges.

Recent Posts