Explosion at the Hydrogen Pumping Station of a Refinery
The event occurred in the hydrogen pumping station, placed between the hydrogen production unit (steam methane reformer) and the hydro-treatment unit. The second stage of the compressor cylinder released hydrogen into the confined compressor building, and which ignited. The failure was caused over-pressure in the piston, probably induced by ice blockage on the interstage cooler and the failure of the compressor housing heating system. A second explosion detached the roof building from the wall, and was attributed to backflow of naphtha and light hydrocarbon from the downstream hydro-treatment unit. Two other compressors were damaged.
Event Date
December 20, 1980
Record Quality Indicator
Region / Country
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Causes
Cause Comments
The immediate cause was extreme cold weather, which caused i) ice blockage of the interstage cooler and ii) over-pressure in the compressor piston. However, the cold weather was expected and the plant had been designed considering very low temperatures. According to the referred scientific paper, the root cause was an inadequate design, failing to identify critical facility and to guarantee for them safe and reliable operation.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
Separation equipment
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
Industrial Area
Operational Condition
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
According to the referred article (Kelly, 1997), the technical aspects which contributed to the failure were:1. Enclosing each compressor into a heated own building, which protected them from the low temperature expected in the location, but created the condition for hydrogen accumulation, detonation and deflagration. 2. Placement of the inter-stage cooler outside the building, which helped logistics but caused the overall hydrogen system to be exposed to considerable temperature gradients.These issues however were only the result of a general absence of adequate safe and technical design. Lack of adequate plan is also evident in the fact that the problems encountered from the start on the compressor unit were never solved. After the accident, the operator has re-built the unit bringing in technical improvements and a systematic maintenance and process safety approach.
Event Nature
Emergency Action
Unknown
Release Type
Release Substance
Ignition Source
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Source Category
References
References
Brian D. Kelly, Investigation of a hydrogen compressor explosion
Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 11 (1998) 253–256