The incident occurred in a facility chrome-plating metals. At the time of the event, a metal roller was being chrome-plated. A short circuit occurred due to a defective contacting (contact rails) on the rectifier. This short circuit caused a spark to reach the surface of the electrolyte bath, and the spark ignited the hydrogen produced during chrome plating, causing an explosion.Various windows within the company were destroyed, but nobosy was injured.

The fire developed on a hydrogen bus during filling, and was detected due to the development of smoke and a smell of burned materials.The power cable of the compressor had overheated. Two are the possible causes: (1) the cable had been wrongly installed or fixed, or (2) the electrical system had caused too high current in the cable. The corrective actions have been:(a) To ship the affected component to the manufacturing company for inspection(b) To replacement of the affected component with a new one. (c) To perform an inspection of the system on all the other buses in function.

The incident involves a gas booster provided by a manufacturer. This device is used in the experimental platform of the project to raise the pressure in pipelines from 60 to 80 barg (from 6 to 8 MPa), allowing the gas to flow in a close loop. After 5 weeks of operation, a critical gas leakage through the vent port was detected.At the moment of the incident, the compressor was working with a mixture of hydrogen and methane (H2/CH4 blend 20/80 %v/%v). The booster was sent to the manufacturer for inspection and reparation. Severe damage in the seals of the vent port was found.

This incident occurred at the electrolyzer of a refuelling station. An employee of the electrolyzers manufacturer was on-site to conduct a reset of the plant power breaker system and to restart gas generation. Whilst putting the system into generation, a loud bang was heard. By reviewing the station CCTV evidence, a cloud of water vapour was seen being emitted from the oxygen vent line of the electrolyzer container. The gas generation system was safely shut down, and an investigation was started to understand the cause and potential impacts.

The broke out at a hydrogen compressor of the reforming unit of the refinery. Following the safety procedures, the emergency stop of the unit was activated and the unit was decompressed using a safety flare. The emergency plan was kept for an hour. A security perimeter is in place. The isolation of the compressor was started automatically. The isolation of the discharge circuit was successful, but the suction circuit could only be partially closed due to a block of a valve. The operators then closed manually the suction valve, by removing the excess of grease that had been applied to it.

A fire broke out following a hydrogen leak on the cyclododecane unit in a chemical plant. A plume of smoke became visible outside the site. The fire was brought under control by putttng the unit in safe mode, implementing the internal resources available on site (monitor lance, sprinkler ring and extinguishers), and finally by the inervention of the internal firefighters. The staff was evacuated and the internal crisis unit triggered. The fire was extinguished in 30 minutes. The post-incident analysis revealed a hole in the connection of the vent manifold, upstream of the evacuation pipe.

This near miss occurred at the at an airport's hydrogen refilling station. Around 4:30 a.m., the hydrogen detector of the station was triggered and a sound and light alarm were activated. The hydrogen filling station was up in safe mode and the hydrogen storage system isolated. The connection pipes were purged via the vent and the power supply cut off. An on-call technician from the company in charge of managing the station arrived at 6:15 a.m., confirmed that the installation has been made safe and stopped the alarm. The leak was located on the compressors filter.

This near miss occurred at an airport's hydrogen refilling station. At 7:35, a hydrogen leak was detected by hearing whistles in the near of a pipe. The operators warned the airport firefighters ten minutes later. Upon their arrival, the firefighters set up a security perimeter of 150 m around the installation. The station is located on the border between the public space and the private space and was surrounded by a fence with a gate accessible only by a code unknown to the emergency services.

This near miss occurred at metal smelting unit of a foundry. At 9:45 a.m., due to a power outage, the cooling pumps of two furnaces containing nickel and chromium stopped. One of the two furnaces was at the end of the smelting cycle. The temperature of the metal was 1300C. Due to the stop of the cooling system, water from the public network took over the cooling function, but was not efficient, causing the cooling coil to overheat.

An in-line inspection of the hydrogen pipeline was being conducted and prior to the last run of the in-line inspection tool (mfl), hydrogen gas was released and ignited from a blind flange connection failure on a temporary separator filter installed at the receiver site. The fire was immediately identified by on-site personnel. There were no injuries. The pipeline section was isolated and de-pressurised to the facility flare. Local emergency responders were dispatched and contained and extinguished the fire. The fire affected the station piping and equipment in the surrounding area.