A cryogenic hydrogen laboratory had a power outage. The cryogenic hydrogen storage was no longer being cooled, therefore temperatures and pressures within the storage system started rising. There were several relief devices on the system, one with a set point of 150 psi (approximately 1 MPa) and a second at a set point of 165 psi (1.1 MPa). The system was monitored by site personnel so that when the hydrogen pressure increased to 120 psi (approximately 0.5 MPa), a manual vent was opened. However, the manual vent rate was not able to control the rising pressure.

A hydrogen safety sensor went into alarm at a hydrogen demonstration facility. The early morning temperature was near freezing and there was a trace of precipitation on exposed surfaces. Upon further inspection following the sensor alarm, a 3,500 psig (approximately 24 MPa) stationary storage vent was found to be releasing hydrogen through the PRD vent stack (PRD = Pressure Relief Device). The alarming sensor was at an adjacent building but responded to hydrogen 20 yards (18 m) downwind from the vent location. The vent release location is 10 feet (3 m) above ground level.

A researcher was conducting an experiment that involved sawdust being heated at pressure using hydrogen gas in an laboratory-scale autoclave.The gas leaked from the autoclave during the experiment and ignited, causing injuries to the scientist (cuts, bruises and facial burns).The explosion caused extensive damage to the building, propelling debris more than 20 metres into a garden area.

In a refinery, a fire occurred at a new reactor for the vacuum distillate hydro-desulfurization unit. Internal gas (hydrogen, hydrocarbon, etc.) blew from a flange of upper piping in the reactor. It ignited producing 0.5-2 meters high flames.

An explosion followed by a fire occurred at a tar precipitator of gas treatment of a coke oven. The extractors were manually activated. Ten minutes later, the operator activates the internal emergency plan. The fuel supply to the installation was interrupted. Approximately two hours later the fire was extinguished by nitrogen inerting. The operator estimated the maximum amount of material that reacted in the explosion of the tar precipitator at 170 kg in TNT equivalent.

The accident occurred at a production, distribution and storage station for hydrogen city busses. After filling the hydrogen cylinders of a bus, the hydrogen detection system of the bus triggered an alarm. The site technician pushed the emergency button and the station was put in safety mode. The technician in charge of filling disconnected the hydrogen hose that connects the station to the bus. The maintenance manager of the bus manufacturer was alerted and arrived 20 minutes later and evacuated the personnel. They closed the valves of the on-board storage system.

During agricultural drainage work carried out by a farmer, an explosion occurred on a hydrogen pipeline located in a field. Flames several meters high were visible and two houses were evacuated. A safety perimeter was set up. The pipeline operator applied procedures to ensure the safety of the local residents and the pipeline.The damaged pipe was listed by the operator. The farmer did not declare the work site and no verification was done before starting the work.[ARIA event 57406]

An implosion/explosion occurred on a furnace in a company of copper metallurgy. The incident occurred at the end of the production cycle, when the furnace bell is lifted at the end of the cooling process. The operator in charge of the lifting was thrown away and slightly burned in the face. The victim was evacuated and the emergency services were alerted. The building structures (windows, doors, roof) experienced serious damage. The power supply was switched off.

A fire developed on a tube trailer transporting 330 kg of compressed hydrogen, while travelling on a highway. The fire was due to a pressure relief valve of a tube releasing hydrogen. The flames reached 10 to 20 m. The fire brigades were able to extinguish the file in 30 minutes.The truck had left a plant of hydrogen production and storage to deliver to a refuelling station. The probable origin of the incident is a fire on the tyres of the truck, which caused the overheating of the tubes, the increase of the internal pressure and the consequent opening of the pressure relief valve.

At around 9:15 a.m., during a routine inspection, a flame was observed at the bottom flange of a reactor in a refinery. A few moments later, sensors near the leak detected a rise in temperature.The facility was shut down in accordance with emergency procedures. The sprinkler system was triggered to protect the equipment. The rapid decompression of the plant towards the safety flare reduced the leak flow rapidly. At 10:12 am, the fire was extinguished.