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This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Runaway from a Propylene Hydrogenation Reactor
During the start-up of a propylene hydrogenation reactor, very high temperatures were generated in the catalyst bed. At the time, propylene and hydrogen were being fed to the reactor which contained a granular catalyst. The temperature rose rapidly, and the hydrogen supply valve tripped at 176 degrees C. Despite the removal of the reactant supply, the temperature continued to rise to more than 600 degrees C, only stabilizing after the reactor had been isolated and depressurized.It was concluded that the start of the incident was caused by wrongly setting the propylene/ hydrogen ratio as a result of faulty calibration of the flow instruments. This allowed the temperature to rise to the point where spontaneous exothermic polymerization of propylene occurred.Investigation of the incident was hampered by the loss of the relevant instrument record charts.
Event Date
September 12, 1981
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
The initial cause of this incident was over-hydrogenation, which in turn generated sufficiently high temperatures to begin polymerization of propylene.
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
insulation of a cold box
Storage/Process Medium
Location Type
Location description
Unknown
Operational Condition
Currency
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
The following recommendations were made:1. Stops should be fitted to key controllers/valves to limit flows in the event of a malfunction.2. Situations where hydrogenation reactors are isolated or have only low flows through them during commissioning, maintenance or other operations should be identified and avoided.3. The integrity of the trip system should be improved.4. Good maintenance procedures are required to avoid the possibility of incorrectly calibrated transmitters being returned to process.5. All records should be retained for a period, and should and incident occur, all relevant records should be impounded immediately (this last recommendation comes from the fact that the Investigation of the incident was hampered by the loss of the relevant instrument record charts).
Event Nature
Emergency Action
Unknown
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Source Category
References
References

ICHEME database, available at the link given (https://www.icheme.org/media/7141/causes-chemical-details.pdf)

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