The FCEV was travelling at approx. 75 km/h (80 km/h speed limit) on a straight, downhill part of the road. Another vehicles was waiting at a STOP sign on the right side, did not see the incoming FCEV and drove into the road at the moment of the FEV passing. The second vehicle hit the FCEV on the back right side. There were only body parts damaged and no hydrogen was released. There was no oil or other fluid spillage and no people were injured.The diagnostic system of the FCEV did not issue any alarm, and there were no warning lights to indicate a problem with the hydrogen systems on-board.

The fire developed on a hydrogen bus during filling, and was detected due to the development of smoke and a smell of burned materials.The power cable of the compressor had overheated. Two are the possible causes: (1) the cable had been wrongly installed or fixed, or (2) the electrical system had caused too high current in the cable. The corrective actions have been:(a) To ship the affected component to the manufacturing company for inspection(b) To replacement of the affected component with a new one. (c) To perform an inspection of the system on all the other buses in function.

A truck-trailer carrying compressed hydrogen cylinders stopped on an autobahn and reported a hydrogen leaking from the cylinders. The highway was immediately closed in both directions. When the fire brigade arrived, the truck had stopped on a hard shoulder, and the driver had al-ready left his vehicle. A pipe was reported to be leaking hydrogen. Fire-fighters closed a valve on the affexted cylinder group to stop the leak.

This near miss occurred at the at an airport's hydrogen refilling station. Around 4:30 a.m., the hydrogen detector of the station was triggered and a sound and light alarm were activated. The hydrogen filling station was up in safe mode and the hydrogen storage system isolated. The connection pipes were purged via the vent and the power supply cut off. An on-call technician from the company in charge of managing the station arrived at 6:15 a.m., confirmed that the installation has been made safe and stopped the alarm. The leak was located on the compressors filter.

This near miss occurred at a depot site with 20 fuel cell buses are operated by a local bus company. A hissing sound was heard coming from a hydrogen tank at the refuelling facility, and the local fire department was alerted.After roughly two hours, the fire brigade managed to close the main hydrogen supply, temporarily solving the problem, and local buses were able to resume their service, but were not able refill their H2 cylinders.

This near miss occurred at metal smelting unit of a foundry. At 9:45 a.m., due to a power outage, the cooling pumps of two furnaces containing nickel and chromium stopped. One of the two furnaces was at the end of the smelting cycle. The temperature of the metal was 1300C. Due to the stop of the cooling system, water from the public network took over the cooling function, but was not efficient, causing the cooling coil to overheat.

Early in the morning of (3:00 AM), the personnel on one of the companies on site reported a potential pipeline leak just south of the valve station. The potential leak was discovered due to bubbling water in the ditch. No visible hydrocarbon sheen was noted, indicating a probable non-hydrocarbon gas leak. Later in the morning, the personnel tested their area gas pipelines and determined that their company was not the source of the leak. Later on the same day, another company tested their pipelines and determined that their hydrogen pipeline was the source of the leak.

At 17:30 on 5 may 2019, the pipeline operator was notified by a third party that there was a possible leak on its hydrogen pipeline, as identified by sound. Operator personnel arrived on the site at 18:30 and confirmed that hydrogen was present in the area. The location was in an isolated area. Manual isolation valves were shut to close in the segment and it was manually blown down. At 08:52 on of the day after the operator determined that the incident met reportable criteria and called the national response centre at 09:22.

A hydrogen leak took place on a trailer carrying compressed hydrogen, located inside the fenced perimeter of a hydrogen station. According to the company managing the hydrogen delivery and refuelling station, the leak did not pose any risk to people or the environment. A preliminary assessment identified a faulty valve s source of the leak, but t was unclear a that time if it was a single defect or a systemic (i.e. design) problem.

The vehicle was being driven in traffic at low speed when it was struck from behind by a full-size pickup which forced the fuel-cell vehicle forward into another pickup. No hydrogen was released and no one was injured.The vehicle was extensively damaged on both front and rear ends and later declared a total loss. A vehicle data analysis indicates that the vehicle and controls operated as designed.