A hydrogen release and subsequent fire occurred at meter station of a pipeline transporting hydrogen to a refinery. Local refinery emergency response team responded and secured the area. The pipeline was isolated, and the fire extinguished itself. During a winter storm, the area was experiencing abnormal freezing conditions and widespread power outages were occurring. As a result, third party hydrogen supply to the refinery was reduced. These upsets resulted in the need to export larger than normal flow rates on the hydrogen pipeline.

A hydrogen leak took place on a trailer carrying compressed hydrogen, located inside the fenced perimeter of a hydrogen station. According to the company managing the hydrogen delivery and refuelling station, the leak did not pose any risk to people or the environment. A preliminary assessment identified a faulty valve s source of the leak, but t was unclear a that time if it was a single defect or a systemic (i.e. design) problem.

The 10 m3 hydrogen storage tank at the hydrogen station belonging to the oxygen plant exploded during production operation. The hydrogen storage tank was installed and used by the plant in 1995, with a design pressure of 1,5 MPa, a volume of 10 m^3, a minimum wall thickness of 12 mm, a total length of 4576 mm (height) and an inner diameter of 1800 mm. After the explosion, there were no metal components left, except for the cement prefabricated foundation of the tank base.

The event occurred at one of the unit producing iron powder, consisting of a furnace with a running belt for the powder, kept under hydrogen atmosphere to reduce and purify the metal. The hydrogen was supplied to the furnace through a pipeline running in a trench below the furnace. A corroded section of this pipeline released hydrogen which could cumulated in the covered trench for at least 30 before igniting. The following hydrogen explosion projected into the atmosphere a large quantity of iron dust, which also ignited.

A gaseous mixture of hydrogen (H2), methane (CH4) and ethane (CH3-CH3) at 54 bar was cooled in a heat exchanger upstream of a hydrogen purification system. The accident started with a double explosion followed by a fire.The heater used to regenerate the adsorbent beds of the purification unit had been repaired a few hours earlier, but the automatic heating mode had not been activated upon restart. Therefore, two regeneration cycles had been carried out cold, causing an overload of the adsorber and the fouling of the heat exchanger.

A hydrogen leak occurred on the hydrogen line of a hydro-desulfurization unit, followed by ignition . The failure was located on a supply manifold of the unit at a support beam. The unit was shut down.The accident was caused by external corrosion which had developed at a support point, under the pipe insulation. A regular thinning of the piping was observed over a length of 450 mm on the lower semi-circumference. The maximum thickness loss was 6.5 mm. The mechanical analysis concluded that the operating pressure was sufficient to cause this initial failure in the weakened area.

The boat was performing a drive test when one of the 280 lead gel batteries exploded and took fire. The local fire brigade was able to extinguish the fire but the above deck section of the boat was extensively damaged. According to Volger and to Wannemacher (see references), the automatic fire-alarm system of the hydrogen storage and the fuel cells were "brought in a safe state" and did not suffered any damage.

A hydrogen leak occurs at on the hose connection of a tank truck being loaded into an industrial gas company. Alerted by the noise, the driver of the vehicle gave the alert. Firefighters from the petrochemical platform to which the plant belongs stopped the leak by closing the manual valves on the tank. The tank, initially at 200 bar, lost only 10 bar in 3h30. The site's sensors did not activate because of the small size of the leak.

The event early on a Saturday morning, when the plant was thus practically empty. Nevertheless, the chronology of the accident can be reconstructed from the testimonies of the few operators who were present at the time:Phase 1: Gas leak - Loud whistling from the hydrogen storage facility could be heard , lasting 20 to 40 seconds.Phase 2: Explosion - The released hydrogen cloud ignites. A very bright, red-orange fireball measuring 15 to 20 m in diameter was visible for 3 minutes. Witnesses in a common room, located 100 m away from the pit, felt the shock wave and the heat from the blast.

A release of compressed hydrogen and subsequent fire occurred during the transportation of truck tractor chassis with a mounted trailer module. The tube trailer module contained 25 fully wrapped carbon filler reinforced aluminum-lined cylinders, 24 of which were fully loaded with 240 kilograms of compressed hydrogen. The module caught fire in the neighbourhood of a hydrogen refuelling station. The pressure relief devices actuated on 12 of the cylinders and released about 120 kilograms of hydrogen that was likely consumed in the fire.