The incident occurred in the building containing the residues of production. The alarm was given by an employee who heard detonations coming from the building. A few seconds later, the building's fire alarm went off. Following the bursting of a container of sodium residues, a fireproof pallet was consumed without flame. The emergency response team opened the doors of the building to evacuate the smoke and then entered the building. They stopped the burning pallet with a powder extinguisher and performed a flame by means of a thermal camera The intervention is finished before 5 am.

The incident occurred in an electrostatic filtration unit. When flushing with air during the start-up phase of a sulphonation plant, an explosion occurred in the upper partof the electrostatic filtration plant (electrostatic precipitators). The most serious effects of the pressure wave were the violent detachment of the manhole cover of the plant, rupture of two insulating supports and deformation of the gas distributor plate.[DECHEMA incident database, event no. 05/ 2001]

The event occurred in the continuous casting of hot metallic melt of the plant.Cooling water leaked through a crack in the cooling water inlet pipe of a secondary cooling line and directly into the hot melt (temperature > 1500 C). This resulted in the formation of hydrogen which ignited on the hot surface. The pipe in question had been in operation for a prolonged period. The material analyses of the component showed that the rupture occurred as a consequence of fatigue. The annual visual inspection had revealed no signs of imminent failure.

Heavy rains (more than 600 mm in 1 day) had flood a factory manufacturing calcium core electrical conductors. The power supply was cut off. The water came into contact with the calcium stored in 150 kg containers, producing hydrogen (7.5 kg per container). The heat of reaction ignited the gas. The fire was extinguished with sand.

Hydrogen was accidentally produced inside the sealed container containing a used battery. The gas, along 6 days deformed the container. Firefighters equipped with breathing apparatus open the container remotely triggering a considerable explosion.

Employees were trying to open the manhole cover (600 mm diameter) of a hydrofluoric acid tank with a grinder, when an explosion occurred. The explosion was probably caused by the presence of hydrogen formed by the acid attack of the metal.

The boat was a 6.5 m semi-rigid electric-powered inflatable canoe, mainly used for greeting and directing pleasure boaters in harbour.It exploded without a flame shortly when an employee of the harbour master's office turned on the ignition after unplugging the batteries. The back of the boat was projected into the air, together with the employee, which was hospitalised. The boat was completely destroyed. Purchased three months before, this boat was one of the three pre-series prototype boats in service in marinas.

The event occurred in a silicon hydride (SiH) emulsion production process inside an enclosed production building. The process generated a flammable gas cloud gas ignited, which later ignited causing an explosion and fire.The explosion caused four fatalities and one injured worker, heavily damaged the production building and its force was felt up to 20 miles away. According to the CSB preliminary report, various investigations are still ongoing to understand in details the sequence of events of this accident.

The fire took place during maintenance works in one out of the three gas extractors of the coke process line. Main cause was displacement of a flange which allowed the entrance of flammable mixture gas (methane, carbon monoxide hydrogen and benzene) which ignited probably due to electrostatic spark. According to the ARIA report (see references) total quantity of gas released was 62 400 m, consisting of 11,7 t CH4, 0,98 t C6H6, 5,1 t CO and 3,4 t H2.During maintenance works, gas extractors were usually isolated and kept under continuous flow of N2.

Explosion in a fine organic chemical plant (Seveso classified )The event occurred during the cleaning of a reactor. At the completion of a batch manufacturing of a soft reducing agent, an operator was rinsing the 3000-litre reactor first with a solvent and then with a water jet . Noticing a smoke release, they informed their team leader, who opened the manhole of the reactor. This action caused a flash type explosion at the reactor entrance. According to the ARIA report (see references), the rinsing water reacted with sodium hydride (NaH) residues on the reactor walls to form hydrogen.