This incident occurred at the hydrogen production and storage unit of (probably) a power plant using hydrogen as a coolant of the turbine-generator system. Hydrogen was produced probably by water electrolysis (the source does not say it) and stored in 6 steel tanks. One of the six hydrogen storage tanks exploded killing a staff member. The investigation determined that a mixing of hydrogen and oxygen occurred in the tank. The needle valve of the hydrogen and oxygen pressure regulator as jammed, and the oxygen leaked into the hydrogen main supply line and entered the hydrogen tank.

a gas leakage (approximately 70% hydrogen, 21% nitrogen and the rest carbon monoxide and other impurities) occurred at the connection between a temperature measurement casing and a flange in the carbonization workshop cleaning tower. The leakage was reported to the plant leader, who issued the request to the workers to use iron cards and rubber plates to plug the leak. The operation failed and the leakage continued. At 17:00, at the request of the plant leader, the workers used a tire inner tube to wrap the leak.

A gas release occurred in the building for the recirculation of processes gas. The gas was a mixture of hydrogen and nitrogen. It occurred at the outlet valve, during works aiming to replace it. This caused the creation of an explosive gas mixture and the surrounding spaces. The defective valve has been identified several years before, its poor design and ageing caused the gas leakage. The ignition took place with 9 minutes delay after initial leakage.

The 10 m3 hydrogen storage tank at the hydrogen station belonging to the oxygen plant exploded during production operation. The hydrogen storage tank was installed and used by the plant in 1995, with a design pressure of 1,5 MPa, a volume of 10 m^3, a minimum wall thickness of 12 mm, a total length of 4576 mm (height) and an inner diameter of 1800 mm. After the explosion, there were no metal components left, except for the cement prefabricated foundation of the tank base.

A gas mixture (25% nitrogen, 73% of hydrogen, 2% methane) leaked, due to the ejection of the check valve from its connection with the inlet pipe. A large amount of the gas mixed with air and ignited, probably due to sparks generated by the ejected check hitting a metal pipe. It followed an explosion. Its pressure wave hit a gas pipeline causing its fracture and a fire. After about 1 hour and 30 minutes the fire was under control. The shockwave from the explosion caused a gas pipe at the back of the workshop to crack and leak, causing a large fire.

A mixture of mainly carbon monoxide and hydrogen was released from a pipeline transferring process gases in a not further specified unit of a chemical plant, generating a flammable mixture which ignited possibly due to static electricity and resulting in 22 deaths and 8 injuries.

The day before the incident, the outlet pipe connected to methanation reactor started leaking gas, which contains hydrogen. The leak was temporarily eliminated by a pressurised plug. On the day of the incident, the pipe leaked again, and the same plugging method was still used to stop the leak. This occurred without shutting down the unit and taking safety measures. Approximately one hour later, a sudden explosion occurred at the inlet line of the methanation reactor.

the explosion occurred inside the lower hydrogenation tower of a hydrogen peroxide unit, damaging the distribution tray inside the tower. 4 were killed and 2 injured, the direct economic loss was 488.2 million yuan. The hydrogenation tower is part of the hydrogen peroxide plant.

The vessel affected by the incident was a gas storage used for the desulfurisation process. The desulfurization gas had high hydrogen content. The vessels had cracks in the upper transverse fillet welds at the gas inlet which caused low stress brittle fractures. The cracks had been found during the maintenance, but not fixed. This eventually caused a gas release. Approximately 2.5 hours after that a leak was detected and reported, a first explosion occurred.

The incident affected the raw material buffer tank (design pressure 0.38 MPa) of a diesel hydrogenation unit in a refinery. This buffer tank is located between the hydrogenation reactor and the raw material storage tank. During pressure fluctuations in the lubricating oil system of a hydrogen compressor, the operator handled the situation improperly, resulting in an abnormal shutdown of the compressor, causing the hydrogen feed pump to interlock and stop.After the pump interlocked, the outlet valve was not closed in time and the two check valves failed.