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This data is from the European Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents database HIAD 2.1, European Commission, Joint Research Centre.

Fire - Other Agent
The fire started as a result of an explosion in the process section of a refinery. An open structure of steelwork protected with reinforced concrete housed the usual furnaces, reactors, heat exchangers, storage vessels, overhead pipe racking, pumps and ancillary equipment associated with the refining of crude oils.Also included in the area were three 46m (150 ft.) high stripping and drying columns built on a concrete base approximately 91m x 21m (300 ft. x 70 ft).A pipe in a gasoline hydrogen treating plant ruptured; a mixture of superheated naphtha and hydrogen under pressure leaked from the fracture and either exploded on contact with a hot process line or was ignited by static electricity. The fire reached its maximum severity within a few minutes.Plant controllers operated an immediate shutdown but the contents of the many pipes and vessels, which had been superheated and were under high pressure, continued to flow from fractured pipes and distorted flanges cascading burning liquid through the plant.At the point in the process where the fracture occurred, water was injected into the system to improve the flow of materials. The corrosion tolerance was accepted at 1mm (0.05 in.) per year but due partly to the presence of corrosive contaminants and an unfavourable flow pattern inside the pipe, corrosion and erosion were much higher than expected, contributing to excessive thinning of pipework, leading to its ultimate failure.The explosion and fire destroyed the stripping and drying columns associated with two hydrogen treating plants; other parts of the processing equipment were severely damaged. The remainder of the process area, offices and ancillary buildings, though seriously threatened remained unaffected by the fire. Part of the concrete cladding protecting the main load-bearing steel columns, and the underside of the platform at first-storey level was affected by spalling but the steel structure itself was undamaged and will not need to be replaced. There were no serious casualties.
Event Date
January 1, 1971
Record Quality Indicator
Event Initiating System
Classification of the Physical Effects
Nature of the Consequences
Cause Comments
Static, over-pressurization, leak, erosion and corrosion
Facility Information
Application Type
Application
Specific Application Supply Chain Stage
Components Involved
pipework, flange, pump, heat exchanger and furnace
Location Type
Location description
Industrial Area
Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
a regular inspection of the pipeline integrity should be done
Event Nature
Emergency Action
Unknown
Detonation
No
Deflagration
No
High Pressure Explosion
No
High Voltage Explosion
No
Source Category
References
References

Event description extracted from the UK database ICHEME in PDF
ICHEME database is no longer available for purchase, but data can be download as PDF for free.
https://www.icheme.org/knowledge/safety-centre/resources/accident-data/
(accessed October 2020)

Primary source was in LOSS PREVENTION BULLETIN, 006, 7-8; (source notavailable anymore)

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