A gas mixture (25% nitrogen, 73% of hydrogen, 2% methane) leaked, due to the ejection of the check valve from its connection with the inlet pipe. A large amount of the gas mixed with air and ignited, probably due to sparks generated by the ejected check hitting a metal pipe. It followed an explosion. Its pressure wave hit a gas pipeline causing its fracture and a fire. After about 1 hour and 30 minutes the fire was under control. The shockwave from the explosion caused a gas pipe at the back of the workshop to crack and leak, causing a large fire.

The day before the incident, the outlet pipe connected to methanation reactor started leaking gas, which contains hydrogen. The leak was temporarily eliminated by a pressurised plug. On the day of the incident, the pipe leaked again, and the same plugging method was still used to stop the leak. This occurred without shutting down the unit and taking safety measures. Approximately one hour later, a sudden explosion occurred at the inlet line of the methanation reactor.

the explosion occurred inside the lower hydrogenation tower of a hydrogen peroxide unit, damaging the distribution tray inside the tower. 4 were killed and 2 injured, the direct economic loss was 488.2 million yuan. The hydrogenation tower is part of the hydrogen peroxide plant.

The vessel affected by the incident was a gas storage used for the desulfurisation process. The desulfurization gas had high hydrogen content. The vessels had cracks in the upper transverse fillet welds at the gas inlet which caused low stress brittle fractures. The cracks had been found during the maintenance, but not fixed. This eventually caused a gas release. Approximately 2.5 hours after that a leak was detected and reported, a first explosion occurred.

The incident affected the raw material buffer tank (design pressure 0.38 MPa) of a diesel hydrogenation unit in a refinery. This buffer tank is located between the hydrogenation reactor and the raw material storage tank. During pressure fluctuations in the lubricating oil system of a hydrogen compressor, the operator handled the situation improperly, resulting in an abnormal shutdown of the compressor, causing the hydrogen feed pump to interlock and stop.After the pump interlocked, the outlet valve was not closed in time and the two check valves failed.

The event occurred at one of the unit producing iron powder, consisting of a furnace with a running belt for the powder, kept under hydrogen atmosphere to reduce and purify the metal. The hydrogen was supplied to the furnace through a pipeline running in a trench below the furnace. A corroded section of this pipeline released hydrogen which could cumulated in the covered trench for at least 30 before igniting. The following hydrogen explosion projected into the atmosphere a large quantity of iron dust, which also ignited.

The fire occurred after a hydrogen released from a venting valve opened for inspection. The hydrogen was at 300 bar and 300C centigrade. The hydrogen ignited probably spontaneously and killed 4 workers and injured additional 3. A similar accident seems to have taken place in the same installation 5 years ago. A safety study of the facility has been requested before the start-up of the plant

The accident occurred during the night during the production of a silicon oil- and additive-based waterproofing agent. A junior technician (hired 6 months back), recently assigned to this post, was left without supervision to manage a process modified very recently and executed only for the second time. In the process, the order of addition of reactants was not specified. The technician loaded first 800 kg of oil into the tank at first floor, started heating the reactor, and descended to the ground floor to pump the reagent.

A violent explosion occurred in a refinery's crude oil hydrodesulfurization unit. The unit's alarm is immediately triggered in the control room, the operator activates the internal emergency plan. The site's firefighting team went to the site and brought a fire under control. The external fire fighters service did not need to intervene. The accident caused two fatalities and to five injuries among the workers.

The accident occurred in the Reactor 6 used to carry out the hydrogenation of a pharmaceutical intermediate.The operation of the plant was organized in two shifts. Since the hydrogenation at Reactor 6 would have taken at least 30 hours, it was not possible to complete the reaction during a single shift. The reaction was commenced at 8:00 a.m.