The aim of the present work is to assess the risk of explosion in closed containments used for the transportation of nuclear materials or nuclear waste. Indeed, it is very well known that hydrogen can be produced due to (i) the radiolysis of different materials within the containment, (ii) the thermal decomposition of mainly the organic part in the containment. Since hydrogen has a very low ignition energy and a very wide flammability domain, it is important to determine the risk of ignition of the subsequent mixture produced by the aforementioned mechanisms.

This Technical Memorandum was originally prepared as an Annex on the topic of Hydrogen Embrittlement for the AIAA Guide to Safety of Hydrogen and Hydrogen Systems (G-095-2004), then in revision [1]. The Guide establishes a uniform NASA process for hydrogen system design, materials selection operation, storage and transportation, and represents a broad collection of aerospace acumen.

In collaboration with Parker Hannifin Corporation, the Fire Safety Branch of the FAA conducted testing to evaluate the effects of three potential failure conditions of hydrogen proton exchange (or polymer electrolyte) membrane fuel cell stacks supplied by Nuvera Fuel Cells. The three conditions examined were a loss of coolant to the stack, short circuit, and a crossflow condition.

VIII.6  Hydrogen Safety Panel, Safety Knowledge Tools and First Responder Training Resources

The purpose of this guide is to provide basic background information on hydrogen technologies.It is not intended to be a comprehensive collection of hydrogen technologies safety information.

VIII.6  Hydrogen Safety Panel, Safety Knowledge Tools and First Responder Training Resources

Fuel Cell Basics and ApplicationsProperties of HydrogenPrimary Codes and StandardsFundamental Safety ConsiderationsHydrogen Safety ResourcesFirst Responder Training ResourcesConcluding Thoughts

The broad use of hydrogen as an energy carrier to tackle the issue of climate change is unavoidable. The emerging hydrogen economy poses new problems to be solved to ensure a level of safety in hydrogen technologies and infrastructure comparable to that for today’s fossil fuels. The pressure of onboard hydrogen storage in early-market

In developing a 70 megapascal (MPa) fueling infrastructure, it is critical to ensure that a vehicle equipped with a lower service pressure fuel tank is never filled from a 70 MPa fueling source. Filling of a lower service pressure vehicle at a 70 MPa fueling source is likely to result in a catastrophic event with severe injuries or fatalities. The Hydrogen Safety Panel recommends that DOE undertake a two‐step process to address this issue.