A hydrogen explosion had ruptured a pipe in the core spray system at the Brunsbttel BWR in Germany. Although the control room instrumentation had at the time indicated a leak of radioactive steam, the nature of the event had not been fully recognized: operators had isolated the leak and continued operation. Investigations suggested that the hydrogen (formed by radiolysis of the water) accumulated in a part of the pipe between catalytic recombiners.

A technical failure in the High-Pressure turbine blades caused high vibrations in lubricating oil pipes. Some pipes broke off and the oil leak caught fire from hot surfaces. Also the generator's hydrogen leaked out and exploded. The fire caused the loss of control air and electrical power of several safety-related components: for instance, two turbo-blowers and main heat exchanges were inoperable The fire also affected a main circulation water pipe expansion joint causing outpouring of sea water which caused the flood of the lower levels of the turbine and reactor buildings

On 17 February 2000, THOR EMILIE was lost. The ship had been chartered by a Swiss company to carry about 2,000 tonnes of oxide zinc ore in bulk from Dunkerque in France to Porto Vesme on Sardinia. The cargo had been transported to Dunkerque on board four barges from the seller of the material, a company in France, and the loading took place directly from the barges to THOR EMILIE.When the ship was about 85 nautical miles south of the island of Ibiza and about 60 nautical miles north of the coast of Algeria, a vehement explosion occurred. The ship sank very quickly.

This report consists of two events: B. On February 23, 2004., one person was injured, apparently lightly, in a fire that broke out following a hydrogen explosion, Herzliya Pituah, Israel An investigation into the incident suggested that the explosion occurred when a fork-lift truck pierced one of the gas cylinders. Everyone in the area was evacuated, and the surrounding rounds were closed to traffic for a period. A. On January 1, 2003, a similar incident occurred at the same factory , when one person was killed.

Explosion at hydrogen unit operated workers evacuated, 2 injured, community rattled.

The release of a blast furnace gas occurred at a section of pipework, due to the rupture of valve seal. The gas did not ignite and the fire service attended as a precaution. The gas was both flammable and toxic, containing 21% carbon monoxide and 5% hydrogen.The onsite emergency plan was activated and the workers sheltered in toxic gas refuges. A concentration of 400 ppm carbon monoxide was measured 200 metres away at the power station, but there were no off-site effects.

The event occurred at a company producing machines for water treatment for the food industry.A pressurized tank exploded killing two workers and shaking windows and ceilings at neighbouring companies for blocks around.The company was developing and manufacturing pressurised tanks used in water filtration system. On the day of the accident, a worker was experimenting with a system designed to add oxygen to water, for farming applications. The system involved was an 80-gallon water storage tank . By starting generating oxygen, hydrogen gas was produced and accumulated in the storage tank.

The event occurred during the decommissioning of a nuclear power plant. It involved a tank containing 100 kg of residual sodium from the decommissioned experimental nuclear reactor which was using liquid sodium as coolant. The reactor had been shut for many years. A heavy alcohol compound was used to to create a stable salt (sodium is very reactive in presence of oxygen or water). This method had previously proved successful.

An hydrogen explosion occurred within the off-gas system, causing the stop of the sump pump; subsequently both trains of the standby gas treatment system were declared inoperable. The sump is part of the off-gas system and the secondary containment. The hydrogen explosion was contained within the system, but the sump pump sustained some damage.

An operator had just replaced the ignition port cover on a hydrochloric acid plant burner. Normal start-up was continued by closing the drain valve in the product run off line and opening the combustion chamber condensate line. At this point a passing mechanic noted that a three foot hydrogen flame was burning from the vent stack. The plant was shut down. No evidence of an explosion or internal burning was identified. No source of ignition was identified for the flame. A small amount of charring occurred on the UPVC stack.