At approximately 8:45 a.m. an employee was troubleshooting a thermal chamber, evaluating a Hydrogen on Demand (HOD) unit. The chamber was reported inoperative that morning. Two units were being tested on a work bench and they were connected by an exhaust hose to an HOD inside the test chamber. The gas was not properly exhausted and began to back up into the hose that was attached to the HOD. The employee removed the side panel on the chamber and it exploded while he were standing in front of it. He was killed by the explosion.

The incident occurred at company producing specialised products for aerospace and aeropwer applications. An employee was operating an induction brazing machine under hydrogen atmosphere when an explosion occurred.

According to the media news, the accident involved an explosion of a fuel cell driven forklift during driving, resulting in an employee's death and 6 light injured other employees. The fire did not spread. This has been confirmed by an OHSA investigation (see references), which however does not specific any cause and responsibility.

On may 23, 1984 between 8:50 and 8:55 pm, employee #1, a dye beam operator, was drawing concentrated sulfuric acid into a plastic pail. He added to this pail the contents of a "drip pail" which had been located under the 55 gallon acid drum. The pail started "smoking" and exploded a few seconds later, sending a plume of acid to the ceiling about 20 ft. Up. Three other nearby employees and employee #1 received skin burns when the acid rained down upon them. A fourth, further away, went to the hospital to have his ear plugs removed.

Employees #1 - #3 were machinists that were in the process of trouble shooting a compressor which had hydrogen in the lines. No actual work was in process. They were only listening for obvious noises which would help diagnose the problem. Employees #4 and #5 were operators who had brought the compressor to the machinists. A common 4" line ruptured, releasing hydrogen to the atmosphere. An explosion and fire occurred as a result. The machinists were killed while the operators were injured and hospitalized.

Employee #2 was using a torch to cut a U-bolt on the bypass piping next to a brine surge tank that potentially contained hydrogen gas in a vapour space in the upper portion of the tank. His job was to remove and replace the brine line that was connected to the top of the tank. Just before the accident, Employee #1 was on top of the tank unbolting the brine line. He was launched into the air by an explosion and struck against some piping or other structure, He was killed. Employee #2 was struck by piping and knocked backward. His head struck a curb and he was injured.

Three workers were working in the sulfur recovery unit (SRU), trying to restore the hydrogen flow. The workers were trying to isolate the cause of a flow problem: hydrogen was entering the regulators at 200 psi (14 bar), but the pressure was dropping to 18 to 20 psi (approximately 1.3 bar) after the passed through the various components of the unit. They closed a valve preceding the regulators and vented the bleed manifold before removing a flange located beyond the valve. One of the worker then re-opened the closed valve to check the flow.

Employees were refilling a rack of 15 hydrogen cylinders that were connected together on a steel pallet with railings. A leak developed at a valve and the pressurized hydrogen ignited. Operations activated a deluge sprinkler system, which turned off the compressor that was pumping in hydrogen. The fire was contained by the sprinkler system as the hydrogen pressure bled off. There were no injuries.

Five barrels of aluminum dust that had been removed from an outdoor dust collector were sealed and stored in the plant adjacent to electrical panels. One of them had somehow been contaminated with water, which exothermically reacted with the aluminum dust to form hydrogen gas. The top of the barrel deformed and glowed red. Smoke was observed and an employee sounded a vocal alarm. The lid blew off the barrel and the mushroom cloud of aluminum dust exploded in a fireball. Nearby combustible material ignited and the sprinkler system activated.

An employee was preparing a batch of glycol stearate emulsifier in a vessel. Upon completion of product, the quality control lab reported that the pH was too high and the product needed to be bleached. When the employee reached the step of adding the sodium borohydride, he decided to relieve the pressure in the vessel by opening the valve used to introduce sodium chlorite. As he opened the valve, sodium chlorite (liquid) residue discharged, spraying the grating and the plastic bucket which contained sodium borohydride.