The incident occurred at company producing specialised products for aerospace and aeropwer applications. An employee was operating an induction brazing machine under hydrogen atmosphere when an explosion occurred.

A fire broke out on a transformer transforming 225,000 V into 15,000 V in a metallurgical plant. This transformer supplies electrical power the site and to a neighbouring factory. In the following three hours, staff brought the fire under control with CO2 extinguishers, the internal emergency plan was activated, and the firefighters ventilated the premises and took readings of the flames using a thermal camera. Meanwhile, however, the shutdown of the electrical installation caused the stop of the operation of an electrolysis unit using zinc sulphate.

Around 4 a.m., a major leak occurred at the outlet of the diesel hydrodesulfurization furnace in a refinery. The goal of this unit is to lower the sulfur content of diesel fuels produced in other units, by a catalytic reaction in the presence of hydrogen. At the moment of the leak the furnace was restarting. The alarms of the temperature sensors at the oven outlet were triggered. At 4:08 a.m., the operator shut down the hydrogen compressors and diesel charging pumps, closed the supply valves and called the emergency status. The first emergency operation was to decompress the unit.

A fire broke out on the insulating plastic elements of an alkaline electrolyzer in a unit of a chemical plant. The shift saw the smoke from the control room. The first action was to drain the potash into a tank provided for this purpose and to shut down the electrolyzer. The on-call electrician interrupted the electricity. The safety technician brought the fire under control in less than 10 minutes using CO2 extinguishers. After approximately six hours, the unit is restarted.

This near miss occurred at the at an airport's hydrogen refilling station. Around 4:30 a.m., the hydrogen detector of the station was triggered and a sound and light alarm were activated. The hydrogen filling station was up in safe mode and the hydrogen storage system isolated. The connection pipes were purged via the vent and the power supply cut off. An on-call technician from the company in charge of managing the station arrived at 6:15 a.m., confirmed that the installation has been made safe and stopped the alarm. The leak was located on the compressors filter.

This near miss occurred at an airport's hydrogen refilling station. At 7:35, a hydrogen leak was detected by hearing whistles in the near of a pipe. The operators warned the airport firefighters ten minutes later. Upon their arrival, the firefighters set up a security perimeter of 150 m around the installation. The station is located on the border between the public space and the private space and was surrounded by a fence with a gate accessible only by a code unknown to the emergency services.

This near miss occurred at a depot site with 20 fuel cell buses are operated by a local bus company. A hissing sound was heard coming from a hydrogen tank at the refuelling facility, and the local fire department was alerted.After roughly two hours, the fire brigade managed to close the main hydrogen supply, temporarily solving the problem, and local buses were able to resume their service, but were not able refill their H2 cylinders.

The vehicle was being driven in traffic at low speed when it was struck from behind by a full-size pickup which forced the fuel-cell vehicle forward into another pickup. No hydrogen was released and no one was injured.The vehicle was extensively damaged on both front and rear ends and later declared a total loss. A vehicle data analysis indicates that the vehicle and controls operated as designed.

A gas release occurred in the building for the recirculation of processes gas. The gas was a mixture of hydrogen and nitrogen. It occurred at the outlet valve, during works aiming to replace it. This caused the creation of an explosive gas mixture and the surrounding spaces. The defective valve has been identified several years before, its poor design and ageing caused the gas leakage. The ignition took place with 9 minutes delay after initial leakage.

The 10 m3 hydrogen storage tank at the hydrogen station belonging to the oxygen plant exploded during production operation. The hydrogen storage tank was installed and used by the plant in 1995, with a design pressure of 1,5 MPa, a volume of 10 m^3, a minimum wall thickness of 12 mm, a total length of 4576 mm (height) and an inner diameter of 1800 mm. After the explosion, there were no metal components left, except for the cement prefabricated foundation of the tank base.