At around 9:15 a.m., during a routine inspection, a flame was observed at the bottom flange of a reactor in a refinery. A few moments later, sensors near the leak detected a rise in temperature.The facility was shut down in accordance with emergency procedures. The sprinkler system was triggered to protect the equipment. The rapid decompression of the plant towards the safety flare reduced the leak flow rapidly. At 10:12 am, the fire was extinguished.

The event occurred at a hydrogen tank, causing a flare and a displacement of air that threw the contract workers against the refinery's metal structure.The workers were using an electric rotary sander on the inside the tank which had been had been drained three days before. The workers had already done previously the same work without incident.

During a patrol, an operator detects a hydrogen leak in a refinery on a footbridge 30 meters high. The origin of the leak is identified 4 days later on a pipe under insulation. The operator proceeds to remove the insulation (under SCBA). The leak is located at the level of a reinforcing saddle. The installation is shut down and put under nitrogen. Thickness measurements and radiographic checks are used to characterise the nature of the crack defect. A leak sealing system (SOFM) is put in place while awaiting the removal of the pipework for assessment during the next shutdown.

The leak occurred on a process pipe of a pressurized at 17 bar and located 3.5 m from the ground The gaseous mixture composed of hydrogen, methane and hydrogen sulfide (density: 0.6) was released to the atmosphere. The operator evacuated a hundred employees, stopped production and put the establishment in the safe mode. The emergency plan is triggered. Water curtains are put into action and measurements of toxicity and explosimetry are carried out.

A fire, fuelled by a mixture of gasoline and hydrogen, occurred on a heat exchanger located at 15 m height in a gasoline processing unit of a refinery. The operator triggered the emergency plan. Site rescue teams controlled the fire during the depressurisation phase of the unit. After the fire was extinguished, the unit was put under nitrogen before being inspected to assess the damage. The fire did not have a significant impact on the operation of the site.

At around 5.45 am, an explosion occurred at an oil refining plant. The operating units of the hydrogen compressors are stopped. Around 8:45, firefighters master the fire. 11 people are taken to hospital with bruises or dust inhalation.In November 2004, two employees died following a leak followed by a fire on this site.

Around 13:45, a hydrogen leak on a pipe occurred in a refinery. Cold cutting of a purge was underway on the equipment as part of a work stoppage. The worker, who detected the leak, stopped the air saw and gave an alert. The installation was safe. The thousand employees presented was confined. A solid buffer was set up to isolate the section concerned by the leak.An error in identifying the location of the blowdown purge caused the event.

The utility production facilities (electricity, water, air, and steam) at a refinery were isolated from the power grid and switched to two turbine generators in anticipation of a storm. At 9:50 p.m., both turbine generators shut down at the same time. Deprived of the necessary water and air, the boilers and all the production units entered a safe state. 1. The effluents drained from the stopped units were sent to detention ponds. 2. The gases were directed to the flare stack. A leak of burning hydrogen and petrol occurred in one of the units.

The vent occurred at the hydrogen manufacturing unit: a pipe of this unit burst, followed by an explosion. The fire was extinguished in about 15 minutes. One employee nearby had a consequence from a burn in the face for two weeks. According to the police, the explosion occurred while checking the temperature in the hydrogen manufacturing device after pouring liquefied butane gas as fuel in the device.

This incident occurred unit at a demonstration of a new technology for the catalytic cracking of vacuum residual oil. An oil storage tank failed due to high pressure. The overpressure in the tank was the result of a backflow of compressed hydrogen gas. When operators reduced the discharge pressure of the feedstock feed pump, high-pressure hydrogen gas in the reaction system flowed back into a feedstock surge drum and then into the cooling oil receiver. The pressure of the cooling oil receiver increased and the oil blew out and the feedstock surge drum ruptured and a fire occurred.