[NOTE: One source speak of a hydrogen gasometer, spanish news speak in general of gas, others of ntural gas or coal gas; considering the main product of the factory, it was chosen for this last version, but is is rather doubtful]This incident occurred at a coal gas storage (gasometer) system of a producer of foundry coke. The gasholder was a variable capacity tank, rising in height depending on the amount of gas stored, with a maximum capacity of 24,000 m3.Company sources said that the fire was caused as a result of a spark and a gas leak that was being repaired by the operators.

A 9000 gal (34 m3) LH2 storage tank exploded during repair of the vent stack. Few days before the explosion, the tank had been filled with LH2, but later on the hydrogen released and ignited at the tank pressure control system, damaging the vent stack. To perform the required repairs, the tank had to be emptied. To this purpose the vessel was purged with nitrogen gas to display the LH2 by letting it boiling. However, the pressure inside the vacuum jacket increased because of the opening the vacuum valve. This pressure increase eventually led to the catastrophic tank rupture.

In 1987, well diggers had drilled a well for water, but had given up on one dry borehole at a depth of 108 meters. According to the source reported in the References, wind was coming out of the hole. When one driller peered into the hole while smoking a cigarette, the so-called wind exploded in his face. A huge fire followed, without smoke, looking bluish at daytime and colour and goldish at night. The crew needed weeks before being able to stop the fire and cap the well. The well remained capped until 2007, when well gas was analysed and revealed to consist in hydrogen with a purity of 98%.

A hydrogen leakage caught fire in the hydrogen compressor area of the continuous reforming unit. The reforming unit and the hydrocracking unit were immediately stopped. The hydrogen flow was cut off, a protective combustion was carried out and the fire was completely extinguished after approximately 20 minutes, with no casualties. The cause of the accident is being investigated.

The fire developed an early morning on a hydrogen bus at a refuelling station for public transport. The fire Department was called to site responding to reports of a fire on the property. A section of the highway was closed as firefighters.According to the bus company release, one bus was destroyed and the dispenser of the hydrogen fuelling station was damaged. The stationary hydrogen storage and the rest of the Explosions were heard and seen from the tanks on the bus that had just been filled.

The broke out at a hydrogen compressor of the reforming unit of the refinery. Following the safety procedures, the emergency stop of the unit was activated and the unit was decompressed using a safety flare. The emergency plan was kept for an hour. A security perimeter is in place. The isolation of the compressor was started automatically. The isolation of the discharge circuit was successful, but the suction circuit could only be partially closed due to a block of a valve. The operators then closed manually the suction valve, by removing the excess of grease that had been applied to it.

A fire broke out following a hydrogen leak on the cyclododecane unit in a chemical plant. A plume of smoke became visible outside the site. The fire was brought under control by putttng the unit in safe mode, implementing the internal resources available on site (monitor lance, sprinkler ring and extinguishers), and finally by the inervention of the internal firefighters. The staff was evacuated and the internal crisis unit triggered. The fire was extinguished in 30 minutes. The post-incident analysis revealed a hole in the connection of the vent manifold, upstream of the evacuation pipe.

Around 4 a.m., a major leak occurred at the outlet of the diesel hydrodesulfurization furnace in a refinery. The goal of this unit is to lower the sulfur content of diesel fuels produced in other units, by a catalytic reaction in the presence of hydrogen. At the moment of the leak the furnace was restarting. The alarms of the temperature sensors at the oven outlet were triggered. At 4:08 a.m., the operator shut down the hydrogen compressors and diesel charging pumps, closed the supply valves and called the emergency status. The first emergency operation was to decompress the unit.

A fire broke out on the insulating plastic elements of an alkaline electrolyzer in a unit of a chemical plant. The shift saw the smoke from the control room. The first action was to drain the potash into a tank provided for this purpose and to shut down the electrolyzer. The on-call electrician interrupted the electricity. The safety technician brought the fire under control in less than 10 minutes using CO2 extinguishers. After approximately six hours, the unit is restarted.

This near miss occurred at the at an airport's hydrogen refilling station. Around 4:30 a.m., the hydrogen detector of the station was triggered and a sound and light alarm were activated. The hydrogen filling station was up in safe mode and the hydrogen storage system isolated. The connection pipes were purged via the vent and the power supply cut off. An on-call technician from the company in charge of managing the station arrived at 6:15 a.m., confirmed that the installation has been made safe and stopped the alarm. The leak was located on the compressors filter.