Each installation should be evaluated based on the results of a hazard analysis considering both of these
scenarios. Separation distances as listed in documents such as NFPA 2, Hydrogen Technologies Code, are
a minimum starting point but may need to be adjusted based on analysis. Recent work by NFPA 2 has
also included overpressure criteria, but the consequences can vary depending on…

The containerized electrolysis unit should be installed per manufacturer instructions, the requirements
of its listing such as to ISO 22734, Hydrogen generators using water electrolysis - Industrial, commercial,
and residential applications, and NFPA 2, Hydrogen Technologies Code. A primary consideration for
indoor installation is the potential for hydrogen releases from the system,…

The suspected cause was a mixture of oxygen and hydrogen that passed downstream from the electrolysis unit into several storage vessels. Hydrogen-oxygen mixtures are very hazardous. Subsequent ignition resulted in internal pressure that exceeded the limits of the storage system. The design of electrolyzers, detection of upset conditions, and preventing the accumulation of oxygen within the…

Documents such as NFPA 2, Hydrogen Technologies Code, and the International Fire Code have quantity thresholds that differentiate requirements for the design of systems and enclosures. However, even the smaller quantities present a hazard under specific conditions, especially for systems that have the potential to release hydrogen into a confined or unvented space. Good engineering judgement…

No, this is not a common or preferred approach. Isolating the source of hydrogen is the best safety practice. Water systems could extinguish the flame but allow the gas to continue leaking and result in an explosion if reignited.

Situations where extinguishing a hydrogen leak prior to stopping flow is safer are rare. Hydrogen releases have a high potential for inadvertent re-ignition and subsequent explosion. Some vent stacks might be equipped with an extinguishing system, but these often can be more hazardous than allowing a properly designed vent stack to continue to burn until the source is isolated.

Releases from high pressure hydrogen systems often make a sound. In those cases, sound might be the
easiest way for a person to know there is a hazard. However, leaks can be relatively small and diffuse,
thereby not making much sound, or alternately large and so loud that they can be very difficult to find. In
both cases, it can be hazardous to move into or through an area.

Dispersion and radiation analysis should be conducted to ensure that the hydrogen cloud will not interfere with the flight path of aircraft. In addition, there may be maximum height requirements due to airport requirements depending on the location of the stack.

There is no maximum flow-rate that can be vented to the atmosphere, but the hazard analysis should consider the potential risk of dispersion, radiation, and overpressure as part of the vent system design. Flare systems are often used at large hydrogen production facilities as one means to prevent a large unignited cloud from forming but will depend on the specific application.

The routing will be dependent on the system design, size of release, and evaluation of the hazards.
Smaller systems are rarely vented to a flare due to complexity, availability and permitting considerations.
Facilities handling large amounts of hydrogen such as production plants will often have a flare system
since they have more capability for this additional onsite infrastructure.…