CHECK OUT OUR MOST RELEVANT INCIDENT LISTINGS!
Disclaimer: The Lessons Learned Database includes the incidents that were voluntarily submitted. The database is not a comprehensive source for all incidents that have occurred.
Recommendation 1 - Overhaul and replace the diaphragms on all cells showing low-purity results. Check on a routine basis the individual cell purity levels to monitor the deterioration of performance of individual cells. Certain contaminants are…
- A redundant safety circuit was put into service and the tank returned to normal operation after the failure. Both rupture discs were replaced and the tank was inspected.
- Important to note that the safety system functioned as…
No Lessons Learned, Specific Suggestions for Avoidance, or Mitigation Steps Taken.
- Equipment that is designed to provide a safety barrier must be stringently tested upon installation.
- A procedure requiring annual testing of both excess flow valves, which includes proper seating for closure and proper flow, has…
Designs for high-tech systems/components evolve based on operating experience. The design changes should resolve identified deficiencies and are part of a continuous improvement process to increase reliability and productivity.
In any event, the lesson that should be derived from this incident is the fact that the explosion could have been avoided either by using an inert gas instead of air across the diaphragm, or by monitoring the hydrogen concentration in the upper…
As demonstrated by the fire discussed above, lack of adequate maintenance, system monitoring and oversight of maintenance of these facilities can contribute to the ignition of a fire that is difficult to extinguish and poses an extreme danger to…
Recommendation 1 - Overhaul and replace the diaphragms on all cells showing low-purity results. Check on a routine basis the individual cell purity levels to monitor the deterioration of performance of individual cells. Certain…
- Place signs on all liquid hydrogen tanks indicating that no water is to be put on the vent stack.
- An additional secondary backup vent stack was added to liquid hydrogen tanks. This secondary stack is designed to be used only if…
Key:
- = No Ignition
- = Explosion
- = Fire
Equipment / Cause | Equipment Design or Selection | Component Failure | Operational Error | Installation or Maintenance | Inadequate Gas or Flame Detection | Emergency Shutdown Response | Other or Unknown |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Hydrogen Gas Metal Cylinder or Regulator | 3/31/2012 4/30/1995 2/6/2013 |
4/26/2010 | 12/31/1969 | 3/17/1999 11/1/2001 12/23/2003 |
|||
Piping/Valves | 4/4/2002 2/2/2008 5/11/1999 |
4/20/1987 11/4/1997 12/31/1969 8/19/1986 7/27/1991 12/19/2004 2/6/2008 10/3/2008 4/5/2006 5/1/2007 9/19/2007 10/31/1980 |
2/7/2009 | 1/24/1999 2/24/2006 6/8/1998 12/31/1969 2/7/2009 |
10/3/2008 | ||
Tubing/Fittings/Hose | 9/23/1999 8/2/2004 8/6/2008 9/19/2007 |
1/1/1982 | 9/30/2004 10/7/2005 |
10/7/2005 | |||
Compressor | 10/5/2009 6/10/2007 8/21/2008 1/15/2019 |
10/5/2009 | 8/21/2008 | ||||
Liquid Hydrogen Tank or Delivery Truck | 4/27/1989 | 12/19/2004 1/19/2009 |
8/6/2004 | 12/31/1969 | 1/1/1974 | 12/17/2004 | |
Pressure Relief Device | 7/25/2013 5/4/2012 |
1/15/2002 1/08/2007 |
12/31/1969 | ||||
Instrument | 1/15/2019 | 3/17/1999 12/31/1969 2/6/2013 |
11/13/73 | ||||
Hydrogen Generation Equipment | 7/27/1999 | 10/23/2001 | |||||
Vehicle or Lift Truck | 7/21/2011 | 2/8/2011 12/9/2010 |
|||||
Fuel Dispenser | 8/2/2004 5/1/2007 6/11/2007 9/19/2007 |
2/24/2006 1/22/2009 |
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Fuel Cell Stack | |||||||
Hydrogen Cooled Generator | 12/31/1969 2/7/2009 |
||||||
Other (floor drain, lab anaerobic chamber, heated glassware, test chamber, gaseous hydrogen composite cylinder, delivery truck) |
11/14/1994 7/21/2011 |
7/27/1999 6/28/2010 8/21/2008 |
12/31/1969 3/22/2018 |
6/10/2019 |
- = No Ignition
- = Explosion
- = Fire