CHECK OUT OUR MOST RELEVANT INCIDENT LISTINGS! 

Disclaimer: The Lessons Learned Database includes the incidents that were voluntarily submitted. The database is not a comprehensive source for all incidents that have occurred.

Recommendations:

The using organization should define necessary activities in order to place hydrogen systems in long-term periods of inactivity. The defined activities should address requirements for rendering inert, isolation (i.e.,…

Place signs on all liquid hydrogen tanks indicating that no water is to be put on the vent stack.
An additional secondary backup vent stack was added to liquid hydrogen tanks. This secondary stack is designed to be used only if needed in…

Upgrade the liquid hydrogen pump control system to shut down operation of the pump and protect the system when malfunctions like leaks, pump cavitation, or loss of purge gas occur.
Verify that maintenance procedures used for liquid…

Hydrogen safety training should be provided to local emergency responders.
Liquid hydrogen installations should be inspected by facility personnel on a frequent basis, consistent with NFPA 55, to verify proper operation and inspect for…

Included inspection on monthly preventive maintenance plan and evaluated alternate materials for better cold-weather performance.

Fail-safe position of control valves in supply lines must be set correctly to prevent damage to pressure vessels.

Recommendation

Set all valves for fail safe operation (open or closed) according to needs before installation in…

Extra caution should be taken when working around elevated pressure storage tanks. Pressure relief valve settings should be checked and then verified by a second party if possible. Proper procedures need to be followed at all times.

The use of inerting gas or other means of separation should be employed when conducting mechanical work where hydrogen gas could be present. More importantly, per CGA S1.3, the vessel should be equipped with a dual relief system that can isolate…

Extra caution should be taken working around elevated pressure or low-temperature fluids and storage. Values should be checked and then verified by a second party, if possible.

Recommendation 1 - Overhaul and replace the diaphragms on all cells showing low-purity results. Check on a routine basis the individual cell purity levels to monitor the deterioration of performance of individual cells. Certain contaminants are…

The hydrogen facility does not meet industrial guidelines for facilities of this type, from the standpoint of (1) the separation distance needed between a hydrogen pipe break and the building ventilation intake to prevent buildup of a flammable…

As demonstrated by the fire discussed above, lack of adequate maintenance, system monitoring and oversight of maintenance of these facilities can contribute to the ignition of a fire that is difficult to extinguish and poses an extreme danger to…

In any event, the lesson that should be derived from this incident is the fact that the explosion could have been avoided either by using an inert gas instead of air across the diaphragm, or by monitoring the hydrogen concentration in the upper…

Designs for high-tech systems/components evolve based on operating experience. The design changes should resolve identified deficiencies and are part of a continuous improvement process to increase reliability and productivity.

Whenever a new program or organization is created, management should ensure that program interfaces and new responsibilities are clearly defined. Effective program integration is necessary to ensure that all responsibilities and requirements are…

Equipment that is designed to provide a safety barrier must be stringently tested upon installation.
A procedure requiring annual testing of both excess flow valves, which includes proper seating for closure and proper flow, has been…

A redundant safety circuit was put into service and the tank returned to normal operation after the failure. Both rupture discs were replaced and the tank was inspected.
Important to note that the safety system functioned as intended. Most…

No Lessons Learned, Specific Suggestions for Avoidance, or Mitigation Steps Taken.

Key:

  • = No Ignition
  • = Explosion
  • = Fire
Hydrogen Incident Summaries by Equipment and Primary Cause/Issue
Equipment / Cause Equipment Design or Selection Component Failure Operational Error Installation or Maintenance Inadequate Gas or Flame Detection Emergency Shutdown Response Other or Unknown
Hydrogen Gas Metal Cylinder or Regulator   3/31/2012
4/30/1995
2/6/2013
4/26/2010 12/31/1969     3/17/1999
11/1/2001
12/23/2003
Piping/Valves 4/4/2002
2/2/2008
5/11/1999
4/20/1987
11/4/1997
12/31/1969
8/19/1986
7/27/1991
12/19/2004
2/6/2008
10/3/2008
4/5/2006
5/1/2007
9/19/2007
10/31/1980
2/7/2009 1/24/1999
2/24/2006
6/8/1998
12/31/1969
2/7/2009

9/1/1992
10/31/1980

10/3/2008  
Tubing/Fittings/Hose   9/23/1999
8/2/2004
8/6/2008
9/19/2007
1/1/1982 9/30/2004
10/7/2005
  10/7/2005  
Compressor   10/5/2009
6/10/2007
8/21/2008
1/15/2019
    10/5/2009 8/21/2008  
Liquid Hydrogen Tank or Delivery Truck 4/27/1989 12/19/2004
1/19/2009
8/6/2004 12/31/1969   1/1/1974 12/17/2004
Pressure Relief Device 7/25/2013
5/4/2012
1/15/2002
1/08/2007
12/31/1969        
Instrument 1/15/2019 3/17/1999
12/31/1969
2/6/2013
    11/13/73    
Hydrogen Generation Equipment 7/27/1999     10/23/2001      
Vehicle or Lift Truck   7/21/2011         2/8/2011
12/9/2010
Fuel Dispenser   8/2/2004
5/1/2007
6/11/2007
9/19/2007
  2/24/2006
1/22/2009
     
Fuel Cell Stack            

5/3/2004
12/9/2010
2/8/2011

Hydrogen Cooled Generator       12/31/1969
2/7/2009
     
Other (floor drain, lab
anaerobic chamber,
heated glassware,
test chamber,
gaseous hydrogen
composite cylinder,
delivery truck)
  11/14/1994
7/21/2011
7/27/1999
6/28/2010
8/21/2008
12/31/1969
3/22/2018
    6/10/2019
  • = No Ignition
  • = Explosion
  • = Fire