A partial pressure sensor for an automated gas environment system (AGES) was not functioning correctly for pure hydrogen flow. While personnel were troubleshooting the problem, a burst disk ruptured resulting in a leak of hydrogen gas and actuation of a flammable gas alarm.

System troubleshooting involved the installation of a small hydrogen gas cylinder and temporary manual valve in an engineered ventilated enclosure adjacent to an instrument sample well. A burst disk associated with the temporary manual valve ruptured upon opening of the gas cylinder valve. The vented gas, exhausting through an engineered exhaust system, triggered the flammable gas detector. Personnel promptly evacuated the area in accordance with established procedures. Appropriate personnel responded to the view more

A facility representative observed pipe-fitters enter a containment tent around a riser with a tool bag that contained a mixture of steel and copper/beryllium tools. The top flange was loosened using a copper/beryllium socket and a steel torque wrench. When questioned, the pipe-fitters correctly stated that this was allowable for initial loosening and tightening of these bolts. A copper/beryllium ratchet was used to accomplish the bolt removal. The bonded riser was shifted to allow access for the IH technician. The standard hydrogen monitoring system (SHMS) cabinet and local sample showed no hydrogen/flammable gas was present.

While the continuous vapor sample was being taken, the pipe-fitters proceeded to put together the copper/beryllium ratchet and socket with a 10" view more

An operator went to purge a process tank per standard operating procedure. The operator reviewed the previous shift's purge time and determined the next required purge time. The operator found that the tank had been purged earlier than expected on the previous shift. Because the earlier purge time was not recognized, the 12-hour purge frequency was exceeded.

Background: On the previous day, during the night shift, an operator performed 12-hour hydrogen purges per the requirements of the standard operating procedure. Each of the hydrogen purges was completed within the required time limits. The operator correctly recorded the time and date that the next hydrogen purges would be required. The following morning, shift turnover was conducted. The direct and root cause of this view more

Installation of a 9000-gallon liquid hydrogen storage tank by a lessee at a building has not been evaluated for effect on the Safety Authorization Basis (SAB) of nearby facilities.

During review of an Emergency Management Hazard Assessment document, a reviewer questioned whether the SAB of nearby facilities had been reviewed for the effect of the installed 9000-gallon liquid hydrogen tank. Reviews by the facility management and facility safety personnel confirmed the evaluations have not been performed.

The direct cause was determined to be a management problem, with policy not adequately defined, disseminated, or enforced to integrate potential lessee hazards into the facility safety program documentation on the 9000-gallon hydrogen tank and delivery. The existing policy view more