CHECK OUT OUR MOST RELEVANT INCIDENT LISTINGS!
Disclaimer: The Lessons Learned Database includes the incidents that were voluntarily submitted. The database is not a comprehensive source for all incidents that have occurred.
The uncontrolled release of hydrogen occurred as a result of the rupture of the No. 6 hydrogen storage tube’s burst disc. This disc failed in response to being overloaded by mechanical stresses developed as water expanded and formed ice while in…
As demonstrated by the fire discussed above, lack of adequate maintenance, system monitoring and oversight of maintenance of these facilities can contribute to the ignition of a fire that is difficult to extinguish and poses an extreme danger to…
An important lesson to be derived from this incident is the need to carefully engineer and test all repairs and modifications to high-pressure process equipment.
This incident illustrates the danger of hydrogen being inadvertently released through blown water seals. Similar incidents have occurred in non-nuclear industrial facilities, but offgas systems present a special hazard because of the…
The investigative report noted that the explosion could have been prevented by (among other things) a continuous gas analyzer test of oxygen and hydrogen product purity. The continuous analyzer should be interlocked to shut the electrolyzer down…
All valves and connectors should be clearly labeled to minimize chances for mis-connection. All technicians must be trained on proper procedures for both taking systems offline and bringing them back online.
Valves for compressed hydrogen…
Normally hydrogen fires are not extinguished until the supply of hydrogen has been shut off due to the danger of re-ignition and explosion. During a gas leak/fire, it is important to shut off the source of the hydrogen if it is safe to do so. If…
The uncontrolled release of hydrogen occurred as a result of the rupture of the No. 6 hydrogen storage tube’s burst disc. This disc failed in response to being overloaded by mechanical stresses developed as water expanded and formed ice while in…
Routine maintenance activities on pressurized hydrogen systems should be conducted per written design specifications. The procedures should provide detailed oversight regarding bolt, nut and fitting replacements or repairs. A formal review…
This incident emphasizes the need for proper gas detection and ventilation systems, as well as fire suppression systems, in laboratories using and storing hydrogen. This is especially true when open flame burners are in close proximity.…
Hazards should be eliminated to the extent possible rather than depending on workers to follow an operations manual.
Potassium carbonate draw-off operations should be improved, and the operations manual should be revised. The manual…
Fail-safe position of control valves in supply lines must be set correctly to prevent damage to pressure vessels.
Recommendation
Set all valves for fail safe operation (open or closed) according to needs before installation…
Recommendations:
- The using organization should define necessary activities in order to place hydrogen systems in long-term periods of inactivity. The defined activities should address requirements for rendering inert, isolation (i.…
In addition to the probable causes listed above, the lack of a standard operating procedure for hydrogen leak detection was one of the probable causes of this incident. Additional contributing factors included the following:
- Severe pipe…
An important aspect of the reliability of a valve is the condition of the stem seal which tends to deteriorate with time and wear. Valves used in hydrogen service should be packed with the correct valve packing material and periodically checked…
Key:
- = No Ignition
- = Explosion
- = Fire
Equipment / Cause | Equipment Design or Selection | Component Failure | Operational Error | Installation or Maintenance | Inadequate Gas or Flame Detection | Emergency Shutdown Response | Other or Unknown |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Hydrogen Gas Metal Cylinder or Regulator | 3/31/2012 4/30/1995 2/6/2013 |
4/26/2010 | 12/31/1969 | 3/17/1999 11/1/2001 12/23/2003 |
|||
Piping/Valves | 4/4/2002 2/2/2008 5/11/1999 |
4/20/1987 11/4/1997 12/31/1969 8/19/1986 7/27/1991 12/19/2004 2/6/2008 10/3/2008 4/5/2006 5/1/2007 9/19/2007 10/31/1980 |
2/7/2009 | 1/24/1999 2/24/2006 6/8/1998 12/31/1969 2/7/2009 |
10/3/2008 | ||
Tubing/Fittings/Hose | 9/23/1999 8/2/2004 8/6/2008 9/19/2007 |
1/1/1982 | 9/30/2004 10/7/2005 |
10/7/2005 | |||
Compressor | 10/5/2009 6/10/2007 8/21/2008 1/15/2019 |
10/5/2009 | 8/21/2008 | ||||
Liquid Hydrogen Tank or Delivery Truck | 4/27/1989 | 12/19/2004 1/19/2009 |
8/6/2004 | 12/31/1969 | 1/1/1974 | 12/17/2004 | |
Pressure Relief Device | 7/25/2013 5/4/2012 |
1/15/2002 1/08/2007 |
12/31/1969 | ||||
Instrument | 1/15/2019 | 3/17/1999 12/31/1969 2/6/2013 |
11/13/73 | ||||
Hydrogen Generation Equipment | 7/27/1999 | 10/23/2001 | |||||
Vehicle or Lift Truck | 7/21/2011 | 2/8/2011 12/9/2010 |
|||||
Fuel Dispenser | 8/2/2004 5/1/2007 6/11/2007 9/19/2007 |
2/24/2006 1/22/2009 |
|||||
Fuel Cell Stack | |||||||
Hydrogen Cooled Generator | 12/31/1969 2/7/2009 |
||||||
Other (floor drain, lab anaerobic chamber, heated glassware, test chamber, gaseous hydrogen composite cylinder, delivery truck) |
11/14/1994 7/21/2011 |
7/27/1999 6/28/2010 8/21/2008 |
12/31/1969 3/22/2018 |
6/10/2019 |
- = No Ignition
- = Explosion
- = Fire