What is Lessons Learned?

What is H2LL?

This database is supported by the U.S. Department of Energy. The safety event records have been contributed by a variety of global sources, including industrial, government and academic facilities.

H2LL is a database-driven website intended to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned and other relevant information gained from actual experiences using and working with hydrogen. The database also serves as a voluntary reporting tool for capturing records of events involving either hydrogen or hydrogen-related technologies.

The focus of the database is on characterization of hydrogen-related incidents and near-misses, and ensuing lessons learned from those events. All identifying information, including names of companies or organizations, locations, and the like, is removed to ensure confidentiality and to encourage the unconstrained future reporting of events as they occur.

The intended audience for this website is anyone who is involved in any aspect of hydrogen use. The existing safety event records are mainly focused on laboratory settings that offer valuable insights into the safe use of hydrogen in energy applications and R&D. It is hoped that users will come to this website both to learn valuable lessons from the experiences of others as well as to share information from their own experiences. Improved safety awareness benefits all.

Development of the database has been primarily supported by the U.S. Department of Energy. While every effort is made to verify the accuracy of information contained herein, no guarantee is expressed or implied with respect to the completeness, causal attribution, or suggested remedial measures for avoiding future events of a similar nature. The contents of this database are presented for informational purposes only. Design of any energy system should always be developed in close consultation with safety experts familiar with the particulars of the specific application.

We encourage you to browse through the safety event records on the website and send us your comments and suggestions. We will continue to add new records as they become available.

How does H2LL work?

If you have an incident you would like to include in the H2LL database, please click the "Submit an Incident" button at the top of the page. You will be asked for a wide range of information on your incident. Please enter as much of the information as possible. In order to protect your and your employer's identities, information that may distinguish an incident (your contact information, your company's name, the location of the incident, etc.) will not be displayed in the incident reports on H2LL.

Lessons Learned Corner

Visit the Lessons Learned Corner Archives.

Key themes from the H2Incidents database will be presented in the Lessons Learned Corner. Safety event records will be highlighted to illustrate the relevant lessons learned. Please let us know what you think and what themes you would like to see highlighted in this safety knowledge corner. You can find all the previous topics in the archives.

A demolition technician noted an elevated combustible gas lower explosive limit (LEL) on a pipe that was being tested prior to cutting (No. 2 pipe). The No. 2 pipe was one of four pipes being tested. The other three pipes tested less than detectable for combustible hydrogen gas. Testing involves tapping the pipe and connecting the pipe to an Explosive Gas Detector via a tube. When an elevated LEL is identified, the pipe is allowed to vent and then retested prior to cutting. After tapping the No. 2 pipe, the work crew left the pipe open to vent and departed the area for the end of shift.

At approximately 7"45 PM on the same day, a crew was on overtime to support roofing activities. Since additional workers were available, the craft supervisor decided to re-enter the viewing view more

Difficulties were experienced with two solenoid-operated globe valves in a charging system. When shut, the valves could not be reopened without securing all charging pumps. During a refueling outage, the two valves were disassembled and examined to determine the cause of the malfunction. It was found that disc guide assembly springs in both valves had undergone complete catastrophic failure. The springs, which initially had 25 coils, were found in sections of only 1-2 coils. Metallurgical analysis of the failed springs attributed the probable cause of failure was due to hydrogen embrittlement. The springs are made of 17-7 PH stainless steel.

Discussion with the valve manufacturer revealed that similar failures occurred on three previous occasions. These spring failures were also view more

One morning a saltwell pump was placed in operation. Operation of this equipment requires that the Standard Hydrogen Monitoring System (SHMS) cabinet be in operation. Later that morning, during the morning surveillance rounds, the Standard Hydrogen Monitoring System (SHMS) cabinet was found not to be in the operational mode.

On the previous day, the night shift saltwell operator assigned to run the saltwell pump had placed the SHMS monitor in operational mode; however, the saltwell system was not started at this time. Shift turnover was conducted and the condition of the SHMS was turned over to the appropriate saltwell operator and shift manager. During the day shift the day shift operator assigned to the complex received approval from the operations engineer to place the SHMS view more

During a facility walk-through, it was noted that a combustible gas (hydrogen) monitoring system installed in a furnace room was inoperable (the system had been unplugged). This system is used to detect and warn facility employees of an explosive or flammable environment. An explosive or flammable environment can only occur if there is a leak in the system, which would not be expected to occur during normal operations. When the system was reactivated, no leaks were indicated.

The incident had the following three causes:

A procedure describing administrative controls necessary to ensure safe operations in the area should have been developed and implemented prior to disabling the hydrogen monitoring system.
The hydrogen monitor was not hard-wired, which allowed it view more

A single-stage diaphragm compressor failed during boosting of high-pressure hydrogen ground storage banks. The compressor sources hydrogen from a 44 MPa storage bank as suction and discharges it at a stop set point of 85 MPa. The compressor capacity is 0.71 m3/min (25 scfm).

The original notice of failure was through an inter-diaphragm pressure indication and alarm. There should not be any pressure build-up between the layers of the diaphragm. Upon opening, hydraulic oil was found, leading to the assumption that the hydraulic-side diaphragm was leaking. Although spare diaphragms and seals were available for on-site repair, difficulty was encountered in attempting to remove the compressor nut above the diaphragms. Similar difficulties were encountered when the unit was returned view more

Incident Synopsis
While disconnecting a liquid H2 fill line from a liquid H2 trailer, liquid H2 escaped, burning a second man who was holding the hose. The man was burned on his hands and on his stomach.

The liquid H2 shut off valve was partially open, but both men assumed it was closed. Prescribed clothing was being worn.

On a given day personnel were removing a blind hub that had been used to temporarily isolate a portion of a gaseous hydrogen system. As a result of a sudden release of 2,800 psig gaseous nitrogen, sand and debris kicked up from the concrete pad and caused minor injury to two technicians.

During the investigation, it was found that:

The temporary configuration change to the gaseous hydrogen system was initiated on multiple work orders and by different individuals. There was no single document that documented the temporary system configuration.
The procedure for performing the work was written using a drawing that had not been updated to show the actual system configuration. Verbal field direction was given when it was discovered the system was not configured per view more

A refinery hydrocracker effluent pipe section ruptured and released a mixture of gases, including hydrogen, which instantly ignited on contact with the air, causing an explosion and a fire. Excessive high temperature, likely in excess of 1400°F (760°C), initiated in one of the reactor beds spread to adjacent beds and raised the temperature and pressure of the effluent piping to the point where it failed. An operator who was checking a field temperature panel at the base of the reactor and trying to diagnose the high-temperature problem was killed. A total of 46 other plant personnel were injured and 13 of these were taken to local hospitals, treated, and released. There were no reported injuries to the public.

Property damage included an 18-inch (46-centimeter) long tear in the view more

A pressure relief device (PRD) valve failed on a high-pressure storage tube at a hydrogen fueling station, causing the release of approximately 300 kilograms of hydrogen gas. The gas ignited at the exit of the vent pipe and burned for 2-1/2 hours until technicians were permitted by the local fire department to enter the station and stop the flow of gas. During this incident the fire department evacuated nearby businesses and an elementary school, closed adjacent streets, and ordered a high school to shelter in place.

There were no injuries and very little property damage. The corrugated roof on an adjacent canopy over a fueling dispenser was slightly singed by the escaping hydrogen flame, causing less than $300 in damage.

The station's operating systems worked as view more

A significant hydrogen leak occurred during refueling of the onboard hydrogen storage tank of a fuel cell-powered lift truck while it was completely depowered. The in-tank shutoff solenoid valve had recently been replaced, and this was the initial refueling event after the replacement. The fuel zone access panel was removed to allow constant visual leak checking with Snoop leak-detection fluid. The event occurred during the final pressure testing of the repaired system when an O-ring failed at approximately 4500 psi, releasing the entire contents of the hydrogen tank in about 10 minutes. The dispenser hose/nozzle was immediately disconnected, and the leak location was quickly isolated to the tank/valve interface. A 30-foot boundary around the lift truck was cleared of personnel and view more