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Disclaimer: The Lessons Learned Database includes the incidents that were voluntarily submitted. The database is not a comprehensive source for all incidents that have occurred.

Because the bottle was located outside at the time of the event, and the hydrogen did not find a source of ignition while venting through the relief valve, nothing serious happened. The failed regulator was replaced and operations continued.…

The following corrective actions have been taken:

The non-return valve was dismantled, cleaned, and tested. Following positive testing, the system was restarted and pressurized without any further malfunctioning.
The hydrogen…

Investigation determined that internal galling has caused the failure rendering the needle valve unusable. The galling was caused by a stainless steel stem acting against a stainless steel seat. This failure mode had been observed before and the…

Lessons Learned
Construction errors are difficult to detect once construction is complete. It is important to develop and use a systematic oversight process for minimizing construction errors during the construction process.

The lessons of this event fall into five categories: (1) proper in-plant communications during events, (2) proper valve application for use with hydrogen, (3) excess flow check valve set point, (4) heating and ventilation and air conditioning (…

Installation

Fittings need to be visually inspected to insure ferules are in place and correctly positioned prior to swageing.
Research staff are responsible for communicating system specifications [gas type, Maximum Allowable…

This occurrence demonstrated the use of data by engineering to evaluate equipment problems. As the data changed, highlighting a problem with one-half inch PVC ball valves, the facility redesigned the valve extension and valve handle to prevent…

Equipment that is designed to provide a safety barrier must be stringently tested upon installation.
A procedure requiring annual testing of both excess flow valves, which includes proper seating for closure and proper flow, has been…

Valve packing on ammonia tanks should be checked on a regular basis.If an ammonia smell becomes noticeable, the tank should be returned to the supplier.

Key:

  • = No Ignition
  • = Explosion
  • = Fire
Hydrogen Incident Summaries by Equipment and Primary Cause/Issue
Equipment / Cause Equipment Design or Selection Component Failure Operational Error Installation or Maintenance Inadequate Gas or Flame Detection Emergency Shutdown Response Other or Unknown
Hydrogen Gas Metal Cylinder or Regulator   3/31/2012
4/30/1995
2/6/2013
4/26/2010 12/31/1969     3/17/1999
11/1/2001
12/23/2003
Piping/Valves 4/4/2002
2/2/2008
5/11/1999
4/20/1987
11/4/1997
12/31/1969
8/19/1986
7/27/1991
12/19/2004
2/6/2008
10/3/2008
4/5/2006
5/1/2007
9/19/2007
10/31/1980
2/7/2009 1/24/1999
2/24/2006
6/8/1998
12/31/1969
2/7/2009

9/1/1992
10/31/1980

10/3/2008  
Tubing/Fittings/Hose   9/23/1999
8/2/2004
8/6/2008
9/19/2007
1/1/1982 9/30/2004
10/7/2005
  10/7/2005  
Compressor   10/5/2009
6/10/2007
8/21/2008
1/15/2019
    10/5/2009 8/21/2008  
Liquid Hydrogen Tank or Delivery Truck 4/27/1989 12/19/2004
1/19/2009
8/6/2004 12/31/1969   1/1/1974 12/17/2004
Pressure Relief Device 7/25/2013
5/4/2012
1/15/2002
1/08/2007
12/31/1969        
Instrument 1/15/2019 3/17/1999
12/31/1969
2/6/2013
    11/13/73    
Hydrogen Generation Equipment 7/27/1999     10/23/2001      
Vehicle or Lift Truck   7/21/2011         2/8/2011
12/9/2010
Fuel Dispenser   8/2/2004
5/1/2007
6/11/2007
9/19/2007
  2/24/2006
1/22/2009
     
Fuel Cell Stack            

5/3/2004
12/9/2010
2/8/2011

Hydrogen Cooled Generator       12/31/1969
2/7/2009
     
Other (floor drain, lab
anaerobic chamber,
heated glassware,
test chamber,
gaseous hydrogen
composite cylinder,
delivery truck)
  11/14/1994
7/21/2011
7/27/1999
6/28/2010
8/21/2008
12/31/1969
3/22/2018
    6/10/2019
  • = No Ignition
  • = Explosion
  • = Fire