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Disclaimer: The Lessons Learned Database includes the incidents that were voluntarily submitted. The database is not a comprehensive source for all incidents that have occurred.
In addition to the probable causes listed above, the lack of a standard operating procedure for hydrogen leak detection was one of the probable causes of this incident. Additional contributing factors included the following:
- Severe pipe…
The investigation team concluded that hydrogen gas was released through a failed 19-inch diameter gasket and ignited under the roof of the compressor shed where it was partially confined. Some gas escaped from the shed prior to the explosion, but…
Consider periodic testing of breakaway device.
Consider determining shear force limit of vehicle receptacle adapter fittings.
This incident highlights the need to properly design safety interlocks. These safety interlocks need to be carefully incorporated into the initial building/plant designs and should consider all of the unexpected occurrences, such as the…
Operation and management of the hydrodesulfurization unit should be strengthened to account for abnormal phenomena such as local corrosion.
The safety review system for remodeling existing equipment and facilities should be strengthened.…
The plant tried to increase production and decrease workload, but failed to notice the potential negative outcomes of this change.
It is necessary to thoroughly simulate all potential negative outcomes of a change in procedures.
…
Lessons Learned The site initiated the establishment of a field patrol and strengthened their onsite monitoring of mechanical equipment during a plant-wide temperature rise.
Quantitative control of tightening torque on bolts should be…
All tank trailers should have a safely accessible auxiliary shut off valve in case of spills.
Emergency personnel need to have access to all of the appropriate protective clothing, including shoes. Liquid hydrogen is stored at 20.28 Kelvin…
In addition to resealing the glove box window, a positive pressure of argon gas was maintained inside the glove box while the course of action was planned. Subsequently, the glove box was cleaned up by specialized hazardous materials personnel…
The lessons of this event fall into five categories: (1) proper in-plant communications during events, (2) proper valve application for use with hydrogen, (3) excess flow check valve set point, (4) heating and ventilation and air conditioning (…
This incident illustrates the danger of hydrogen being inadvertently released through blown water seals. Similar incidents have occurred in non-nuclear industrial facilities, but offgas systems present a special hazard because of the…
In any event, the lesson that should be derived from this incident is the fact that the explosion could have been avoided either by using an inert gas instead of air across the diaphragm, or by monitoring the hydrogen concentration in the upper…
Recommended Actions:
The recommended safe storage time for AHF is two years. Contact the vendor for pick up and disposal for cylinders more than two years old. (Unused gas should also be returned, even if it has been less than two years…
On-site personnel performing treatment of reactive metals/chemicals must continue to exercise caution. Although there is an inherent risk in treating reactive metals/chemicals, personnel must adhere to conduct of operations principles to include…
In the future, the laboratory will issue a memorandum about this incident to illustrate the need to wear safety glasses with side shields, store chemicals compatibly, take care when placing chemicals in the refrigerators for storage, and keep the…
In this case, failure to recognize a run of tubing still maintaining pressure could have been avoided if such information was provided in a safety briefing. Knowledge of any job is the utmost importance in promoting and maintaining a safe working…
No Lessons Learned, Specific Suggestions for Avoidance, or Mitigation Steps Taken.
Key:
- = No Ignition
- = Explosion
- = Fire
Equipment / Cause | Equipment Design or Selection | Component Failure | Operational Error | Installation or Maintenance | Inadequate Gas or Flame Detection | Emergency Shutdown Response | Other or Unknown |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Hydrogen Gas Metal Cylinder or Regulator | 3/31/2012 4/30/1995 2/6/2013 |
4/26/2010 | 12/31/1969 | 3/17/1999 11/1/2001 12/23/2003 |
|||
Piping/Valves | 4/4/2002 2/2/2008 5/11/1999 |
4/20/1987 11/4/1997 12/31/1969 8/19/1986 7/27/1991 12/19/2004 2/6/2008 10/3/2008 4/5/2006 5/1/2007 9/19/2007 10/31/1980 |
2/7/2009 | 1/24/1999 2/24/2006 6/8/1998 12/31/1969 2/7/2009 |
10/3/2008 | ||
Tubing/Fittings/Hose | 9/23/1999 8/2/2004 8/6/2008 9/19/2007 |
1/1/1982 | 9/30/2004 10/7/2005 |
10/7/2005 | |||
Compressor | 10/5/2009 6/10/2007 8/21/2008 1/15/2019 |
10/5/2009 | 8/21/2008 | ||||
Liquid Hydrogen Tank or Delivery Truck | 4/27/1989 | 12/19/2004 1/19/2009 |
8/6/2004 | 12/31/1969 | 1/1/1974 | 12/17/2004 | |
Pressure Relief Device | 7/25/2013 5/4/2012 |
1/15/2002 1/08/2007 |
12/31/1969 | ||||
Instrument | 1/15/2019 | 3/17/1999 12/31/1969 2/6/2013 |
11/13/73 | ||||
Hydrogen Generation Equipment | 7/27/1999 | 10/23/2001 | |||||
Vehicle or Lift Truck | 7/21/2011 | 2/8/2011 12/9/2010 |
|||||
Fuel Dispenser | 8/2/2004 5/1/2007 6/11/2007 9/19/2007 |
2/24/2006 1/22/2009 |
|||||
Fuel Cell Stack | |||||||
Hydrogen Cooled Generator | 12/31/1969 2/7/2009 |
||||||
Other (floor drain, lab anaerobic chamber, heated glassware, test chamber, gaseous hydrogen composite cylinder, delivery truck) |
11/14/1994 7/21/2011 |
7/27/1999 6/28/2010 8/21/2008 |
12/31/1969 3/22/2018 |
6/10/2019 |
- = No Ignition
- = Explosion
- = Fire